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The United States, by executive order, has unilaterally forfeited assassination
as an instrument of foreign policy. Some Americans now believe that a declared
prohibition unreasonably limits U.S. capability to counter the national security
threats posed by terrorists, revolutionaries and Third World crusaders. This
thesis is an examination of the national security policy dilemma which political
assassination presents. Circumstances are conceivable in which utilitarian
calculations would endorse assassination as the most moral application of deadly
force. Yet the draconian practice of assassination as an instrument of American
foreign policy seems to contradict democratic ideals. This thesis details both
arguments and draws two major conclusions. First, assassination cannot support
long-term U.S. policy goals or warfighting efforts. Ultimately, such methods
could weaken America's global position. Second, while assassination has no place
in the U.S. warfighting arsenal, the assassination ban itself has become
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States has unilaterally forfeited assassination as an instrument of
foreign policy. In 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in response
to allegations that in the early 1960s the CIA had been involved in plots to
assassinate premiers Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro. Contained in this thirty-
six page document were seventeen words prohibiting assassination: "No
employee of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, political assassination." Today the assassination ban is contained in Executive
Order 12333.
It is difficult to argue with the commendable moral perspective of the order.
Yet some Americans now believe that a declared prohibition unreasonably limits
U.S. capability to counter the national security threats posed by terrorists,
revolutionaries and Third World crusaders. This thesis is an examination of the
national security policy dilemma which political assassination presents.
Those who favor rescinding the assassination ban contend that if a threat to
U.S. national interests assumes a personal character, then the counter to that
threat is justified, in the name of expedience, to do the same. This paper presents
three arguments favoring this orientation. First, assassination could save lives.
Since assassination goes directly to the source, it is a more humane application
of deadly force. The second argument is that assassination may be an
vn
indispensable weapon in a Third World regional or low intensity conflict. In
many Third World nations, the lines separating armies from the personal agendas
of the dictator are blurred to the point that it is difficult to effectively attack one
without attacking the other. Finally, in many Third World states, the concept of
nation differs from the Western version. It is the regime, not the security of the
state, which is most highly prized. A deterrent threat which fails to target the
regime, therefore, is ineffectual.
Squaring off against these arguments are six practical and philosophical
considerations. First, assassination, if attempted, is a highly complex operation.
Defeating the security which surrounds military and political leadership may
prove to be prohibitively difficult. The second argument against assassination is
the difficulty of identifying agents to carry out such an operation. American
soldiers are not assassins. If left to surrogates, U.S. political and military leaders
would lose control over the endeavor. Third, there is very little historical
evidence to suggest that assassination can accomplish its purpose. The linkage
between a specific individual, particularly at the level of national leadership, and
a disagreeable policy which his nation or organization may embrace, is often
exaggerated and never completely clear. Forth, an assassination is only logical if
the successor is more benign. However, predicting the identity and character of
that successor is problematic. Fifth, if the United States chooses to assassinate its
enemies, then, having set the moral agenda, it invites retaliation in kind. Finally,
assassination, perceived by many to contradict democratic norms, may weaken
vin
America's global credibility and corrode its domestic consensus.
From these arguments, this thesis draws two major conclusions. First,
assassination cannot support long-term U.S. policy goals or warfighting efforts.
Ultimately, such methods could weaken America's global position. Second, while
assassination has no place in the U.S. warfighting arsenal, the assassination ban
itself has become dysfunctional and requires reevaluation.
Because the issue of assassination in American foreign policy is a dilemma,
and not an absolute, policy which treats assassination as an absolute, as the
executive order does, is flawed. Surviving the changing patterns of the global
political milieu necessitates a framework for decision making which is also
capable of change and continual adaptation to new situations. This paper
recommends, therefore, normalizing policy toward political assassination, thus
allowing existing conventions and institutions to contain the matter. Normalizing
assassination policy fixes the burden of moral deliberation on existing democratic
institutions rather than specific laws. Only this form of regulation allows
adjustment of policy in the light of discussion and experience.
IX

I. THE DEADLY DILEMMA
Beginning on December 22, 1974, Seymour Hersh wrote a series of articles for
the New York Times which profoundly influenced America's waning confidence
in its government. Hersh alleged that the CIA, despite its charter prohibiting
any security or police function within the United States, had conducted a massive
domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration against the anti-
war movement and other dissident groups. These revelations set in motion an
extraordinary outburst of congressional and executive inquiries which uncovered
even darker secrets: the CIA had plotted to assassinate foreign leaders! 1
The timing of these disclosures could not have been worse for the CIA.
Watergate was a recent memory. The pervasive attitude of distrust and suspicion
on Capitol Hill was matched only by President Ford's desire to distance himself
from the legacy of his predecessor and the specter of an imperial presidency. The
President acted quickly, preempting congressional action. On advice of the
Rockefeller Commission,2 Ford issued Executive Order 11905. Contained in the
thirty-six page executive order were seventeen words banning assassination: "No
^ee Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations,
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975).
2The commission chaired by then Vice-President Rockefeller is formally
referred to as the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States.
employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, political assassination."3 With these words, the United States government
unilaterally forfeited assassination as an instrument of foreign policy.4
It is difficult to argue with the commendable moral perspective of this action.
Indeed, each president since Ford has likewise embraced this moral declaration.
President Carter's Executive Order Number 12306 modified the assassination ban
only marginally.5 Reagan and Bush also adopted the prohibition which is
currently contained in Executive Order Number 12333.6
However laudable its veneer, the assassination ban presumes an absolute
moral frame of reference; and absolutes rarely endure the corrosive forces of
reality. Recent times have witnessed armies collide and blood spill, seemingly
because of the adventurism of a demagogic few. These events have prompted
many to question the wisdom of the assassination ban. Are there situations in
Executive Order 11905, Federal Register 7707 (1976).
^he United States is the only nation with an explicit prohibition against
assassination.
5Carter amended the assassination ban to read: "No person employed by or
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage, or conspire to
engage, in assassination." See Executive Order Number 12306, Federal Register
3678 (1978). The most prominent feature of this amendment is the removal of
"political" as a modifier of assassination. The impact of this modification is
unclear, although it may be more grammatically correct. Some argue that
"political assassination" is a redundancy since the political context of assassination
seems to be its distinguishing feature.
6See Executive Order Number 12333, Federal Register 59,941 (1981).
which an assassin's bullet may provide the most expeditious, least costly solution
to a crisis? Is assassination ever the moral alternative?
These questions present policy makers with a "deadly dilemma."
Assassination as an instrument of American foreign policy is a dilemma since
deadly force of this nature seems to contradict the democratic ideal. Yet
circumstances are conceivable in which utilitarian calculations would endorse
assassination not only as a more moral alternative, but as the moral imperative.
This thesis is a study of the deadly dilemma. It is not merely a history or a
survey of assassination. It deals with the relationship between a particular genre
of assassination (characterized by its origin: the state; its target: a foreign enemy
of the state; and its goal: the enhancement of national security) and the modern
American situation. Within this framework, we shall attempt to answer two
questions. The first considers the efficacy of assassination as a political tool.
Could an assassination support long-term U.S. policy goals or warfighting efforts?
The second question challenges the value of the assassination ban itself. Does an
executive order which explicitly prohibits political assassination ultimately
enhance or diminish America's global position?
The importance of these questions is clear. In matters concerning the
interaction of law, morality and policy, the hard cases are the most instructive.
A discussion about the assassination ban parallels the continuing dialogue qver
the American national identity. Considered as a case study, this polemic
addresses the larger issue of the force of moral and ethical considerations in
American national security policy.
The urgency of this question may be less apparent. Since the political milieu
surrounding the adoption of the ban was not conducive to an objective treatment,
the issue of assassination still awaits substantive debate. Meanwhile, the
immediate demands of national security are corroding the ethical underpinnings
of the prohibition. This decay is evident both in public discourse (witness the
editorial debates appearing prior to and during Desert Storm concerning the
disposition of Saddam Hussein) and in recent military operations which have
seemed to openly challenge the executive order. Before the assassination ban
quietly becomes an anachronism, a token of America's lost naivety, it is
imperative to articulate and objectively analyze both perspectives of the deadly
dilemma.
Brian Jenkins writes:
It could be said that assassination is an inappropriate subject for analysis
because it raises such profound philosophical issues. Inevitably, one's
views are personal ones . . . ."7
Jenkins's warning is appropriate. With this in mind, this paper strives to temper
the influences of personal inclination by presenting both platforms of the
assassination debate and by using the historical case, wherever possible.
7Brian Jenkins, "Should Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include
Assassination?" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1987), iii.
Despite methodological safeguards, perfect objectivity is impossible in
normative discourse. Personal values have unavoidably influenced this study.
It may be useful, therefore, to present these opinions from the outset in order to
allow the reader to recognize failures in objectivity. They are twofold. First,
political assassination has no place in American foreign policy. Second, despite
the inadvisability of political assassination, the assassination ban itself will become
dysfunctional vis-a-vis the modern threats to U.S. and global security. Indeed, the
prohibition may already be moribund, awaiting the proper test case to prove its
ultimate inefficacy.
If these propositions appear to be fundamentally opposed or even mutually
exclusive, then the ensuing chapters should disengage any apparent incongruities.
Chapters Two and Three address the history of political assassination in the
American context. Chapter Two examines the history of political assassination
as an instrument of American foreign policy prior to the adoption of the executive
order. Chapter Three traces the evolution of the assassination ban itself. The next
two chapters are the most critical. Chapter Four presents the utilitarian
arguments that favor assassination and demonstrates the weaknesses of a clear
statement prohibiting assassination. Chapter Five reconsiders these arguments
from a broader ideological perspective. The final chapter summarizes the salient
arguments presented in this thesis and proposes policy alternatives sensitive to
these arguments. Since this chapter represents a synthesis of ideas,' the influences
of personal biases are most evident. The author acknowledges, therefore, that
these conclusions are far less important than the various perspectives contained
in the body of this paper. Before proceeding with an analysis of these
perspectives, however, it is appropriate to further clarify the language and
circumscribe the scope of this discussion.
A. THE STATE OF THE INQUIRY INTO ASSASSINATION
Recorded instances of political assassination coincide with mankind's earliest
known efforts at political organization.8 The first objective inquiries into
assassination, therefore, predate Christ and transcend cultural and geographical
reference. Various philosophers and analysts throughout history have argued
about the evils of assassination as well as the right and, in some cases, the
responsibility of people to assassinate undesirable leaders. Perhaps the two most
important pre-modern commentators on assassination are Aristotle and Saint
Thomas Aquinas.
The Western concept of "justifiable tyrannicide" is Aristotelian. Aristotle was
the first to attempt to assemble, in a purposeful and coherent manner, the
necessary elements in which tyrannicide could be justifiably contemplated.9 He
offered both usurpation of power and misrule as grounds warranting tyrannicide.
Aristotle may have also instituted a tradition of moderation for serious thinkers
in such matters. He cautioned that violence should be aimed against the ruler
8Franklin L. Ford, Political Murder (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1985), 5.
9Ford, 44-45.
himself only if no other discernible remedy was available. He was careful to
draw a line between the justifiable case and a "pseudo-tyrannicide" undertaken
on less defensible grounds. Furthermore, Aristotle pointed out that a legitimate
resistance of this nature must take the form of elite action from within the body
politic.
The resiliency of the Roman Empire owes much to its respect for civil law.
Because of Rome's record of conservative yet flexible institution-building, and its
efforts to accommodate conflicting social demands, tyrannicide did not receive
such analytical attention. Accordingly, the murders of Tiberius Gracchus and
Julius Caesar were indicative not of a principled action taken on behalf of the
Roman community as a whole, but of a malignant social crisis. 10 Despite these
assassinations, which are among history's most infamous, the Roman Empire
added little to our understanding of assassination.
Biblical consideration of tyrannicide is limited to the Old Testamental. 11
However, some of the most scholastic and influential Christian commentators
have confronted this question. Among these is Saint Thomas Aquinas, thought
by many to be the culminating figure in the development of medieval theology.
Thomistic reflections on tyrannicide transcend the dogmatism of antiquity to
present a more sophisticated acknowledgement of the nuances of political
10
Ibid., 50.
nFord identifies three "fairly distinct clusters of politically motivated or at any
rate politically significant" murders in the Book of Judges, the Second Book of
Samuel, and the Second Book of Kings. See Ibid., 8-24.
assassination. Although his earlier works reflect the Aristotelian principles of
justifiable tyrannicide adapted marginally to incorporate the Thomistic notions of
natural law and the common good,12 he offers a more modern approach in De
Regimine Principum. Here he writes, "good kings would be likely to be slain
more often than tyrants, for the rule of good kings was hard on evil-doers and
evil men were more likely than good men to resort to such a desperate measure
as tyrannicide."13 Saint Thomas may have been the first to fully appreciate the
complex character of political assassination.
The consideration of assassination enjoys a broad temporal scope. With this
acknowledgement, it is unclear why assassination receives so little scholastic
attention today. Most recent studies of assassination are either journalistic or
historical.
Brian Jenkins, a highly regarded expert on terrorism, has provided some
notable exceptions. For example, in a RAND Paper, "Should Our Arsenal Against
Terrorism Include Assassination?" Jenkins isolates the essential variables of this
issue. He presents five arguments favoring assassination as a weapon against
terrorism and ten antithetical arguments. Although he limits the scope of his
discussion to assassination as a weapon against terrorism, most of the variables
12In Commentum in IV Libros Sententiarum, for example, Saint Thomas writes
that "he who kills' the tyrant for the liberation of his country is praised and
receives a reward." See Ibid., 125. St. Thomas presents his discussion of natural
law and the common good in Summa Theologica .
13Cited in Ford, 125.
he discusses are equally applicable to the broader perspective presented here.
Indeed, this paper borrows liberally from Jenkins's arguments.
Franklin Ford, who has already been cited several times in this chapter, has
written one of the most comprehensive books available on assassination. In
Political Murder, Ford presents a cross-cultural survey of the uses of murder in
politics. Ford relies on historical analysis to support his thesis that the results of
assassination rarely secure the aims of its agents. With the exception of its
historical value, however, Political Murder is only marginally applicable to this
study. Ford deals primarily with the lone assassin, the perpetrator of most
political murders according to Ford.
Murray Clark Havens, Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitfs collaboration, The
Politics of Assassination, complements Ford's book by concentrating on the recent
history of assassination. This study of the impact of assassination on political
systems is based on ten case studies. The authors conclude that where
institutions are strong, assassinations have little impact. While this study
provides a valuable historical record, it is also of limited value here since the
assassinations which it discusses also differ in kind from those considered in this
paper.
Michael Walzer's Tust and Unjust Wars is a superior commentary on military
ethics. Although any specific treatment of assassination is cursory, he renders
coherent principles which must be considered in any careful treatment of political
assassination. Walzer surveys the moral issues which complicate modern warfare.
Most importantly, he illuminates the often conflicting influences of military
necessity and liberal democratic tradition.
It is immediately apparent from even a casual review of the literature that
assassination is ill-defined as a subject of study. It has been variously defined
and used in rather divergent ways. That a single rubric contains the actions of
a lone crusader with indications of psychological disturbances, like Sirhan
Sirhan,14 and those of Israeli commandos unemotionally carrying out state
policy, indicates acute analytical imprecision. It is important, therefore, to clarify
the concept of assassination in the context of this paper.
B. FOCUSSING A BLURRY REALITY
Although executive orders are not laws, they function similarly. Executive
orders define boundaries for government policy. They do not contain the
punitive element of a law, but an individual crossing these boundaries, even a
president, should expect to incur, at a minimum, political costs. It is imperative,
therefore, that the margins which define illicit conduct within an executive order
are clear, that the guidelines it establishes are discernible.
The assassination ban contained in Executive Order 12333 has established only
vague margins. The ban clearly prohibits political assassination, yet it fails to
clarify this sweeping term. Two explanations present themselves for this. First,
the drafters of the ban may have simply been negligent. They may have
14See Robert Blair Kaiser, RFK Must Die! (New York: E. P. Dutton and
Company, Inc., 1970).
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assumed that the term "political assassination" requires no further explication. A
more likely explanation for the lack of clarity is that the authors of the executive
order hoped to allow flexibility within the ban by permitting the decision maker
to define his own terms.
This indeterminacy has, in fact, produced the opposite effect. The decision
maker who adopts anything other than the broadest definition of political
assassination, risks reproach for violating the ban. The result is self-deterrence.
1. Assassination Writ Large
Without clarification, the phrase "political assassination" conjures up images
of two failed assassination attempts. Months of congressional investigation in the
mid 1970s revealed that the CIA had directly plotted the deaths of two leaders
during the preceding decade, Premiers Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice
Lumumba of the Congo (now Zaire). 15 The details of these events forged the
American perception of assassination. They are classical assassination scenarios,
"assassination writ large."
Between 1960 and 1965, a period spanning the administrations of
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, the CIA considered at least eight
15The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, established on 21 January 1975
to investigate alleged CIA indiscretions, became sidetracked by allegations of CIA
assassination plots. Although the assassination plots were not a part of the
Committee's statutory mandate, committee chairman Frank Church established
a special Subcommittee on Assassination in order to expedite the probe into these
allegations.
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separate plots to assassinate Castro. 16 Planning began in earnest eight months
before the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The CIA, working through Robert
Maheu, a former FBI agent, asked John Roselli, a reputed figure in the criminal
underworld, to locate Cubans willing to assassinate Castro. Roselli soon brought
two other underworld figures, Sam Giancana and Santos Trafficante, into the
operation. These men developed a plan which involved poisoning Castro's food
in a Havana restaurant. The assassination plotters actually delivered the poison
pills to operatives in Cuba, but the CIA subsequently abandoned this effort after
several of the Cuban operatives assigned to administer the poison to Castro
backed out. Other schemes never advanced beyond the CIA laboratory. These
involved such exotic devices as a fountain pen containing a poison needle, deadly
bacterial powders, poisonous cigars, exploding sea shells and a contaminated
diving suit.
The committee found direct evidence of one other case of CIA intent to
assassinate. Patrice Lumumba had threatened to bring the Congo under Soviet
influence after it declared independence from Belgium in 1960. In response,
assassination plotters within the CIA devised two main methods for killing him.
One involved the administration of a biological toxin. The other was "simply" to
shoot him with a high-powered rifle. The plan proceeded as far as the delivery
^Congress, Senate 1975, 4-6.
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of a poisonous substance to Africa. The intended assassins, however, never made
the attempt 17
These findings shaped the American perception of political assassination
as conspiratorial murder—repugnant, lurid and laughingly ineffective. These were
the types of scenarios which the assassination ban justifiably sought to outlaw.
But "assassination," undefined within the text of the executive order, encompasses
actions which differ both in degree and kind from the classical scenarios. The
next section discusses the problems of definitions.
2. What is Assassination?
It is not important for this paper to arrive at a precise definition of
assassination. Indeed, since the assassination ban itself provides no clarifications,
definitions are as irrelevant as they are ubiquitous. A more meaningful pursuit
is to establish boundaries within which a reasonable person might interpret a
government action to be political assassination. This is an arbitrary and highly
theoretical endeavor, but it is an important one for our analysis of the
assassination ban. The prudent government official must consider exactly this if
he feels that his policy may contradict the prohibition. He must establish criteria
for defining boundaries which satisfy his colleagues and superiors in government,
the American public and his own moral standards. This section suggests a logical
set of criteria for determining if a policy or particular state action is likely to
precipitate charges of political assassination.
17Congolese rivals killed Lumumba in 1961 without CIA assistance.
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Advancing definitions and establishing criteria are distinct tasks, but they
are not unrelated. Previously advanced definitions may be helpful for
highlighting certain elements which establish these operational margins. Selecting
from the field of definitions requires care, however, since assassination is a word
that evokes emotional response. Jenkins describes it as a word that is "hissed, not
spoken."18 Most definitions contain either judgmental or euphemistic language,
depending on the intent of the person who is advancing the definition.
The word "assassin" derives from the Arabic "Hashishiyyin," and refers
historically to one of the Shiite Ismali sects in Syria and Iran in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, which waged war through assassination. 19 Although the
Arabic original was non-judgmental, a negative connotation has persisted in the
West. Webster's, for example, defines assassination as "premeditated and
treacherous murder."20 Western repugnance for assassination is reminiscent of
18Jenkins, Assassination, 1.
19The Hashishiyyin, or "Order of the Assassins," emerged as a result of
irreconcilable splintering within the Ismali movement at the end of the eleventh
century. Founder Hasan-i Sabbah envisioned a series of mountain fortresses,
made impregnable through the commitment of devoted men. For centuries this
sub-sect of fanatical Ismalis, also called the Old Men of the Mountains, waged
war by assassinating those leading men who stood as obstacles to the propagation
of their religion. They became known as the "Hashishiyyin," or hashish-eaters
because of the legend that the young men chosen as assassins were promised
paradise by their leaders. They were given a foretaste of paradise through
hashish. See Ford, 100-104. See also Edward Hyams, Killing No Murder
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1969), 30-32.
2 Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language
(New York: Portland House 1989), 89.
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the Western military tradition which regarded the cross-bow as somehow
sneaky.21 This congruency is even more remarkable since the Second Lateran
Council in 1139 sought to impose a ban on the cross-bow. Americans, who have
witnessed the assassinations of four presidents, are especially likely to condemn
assassination without hesitation.
Franklin Ford presents a definition which contains no apparent bias. He
defines assassination as "the intentional killing of a specified victim or group of
victims, perpetrated for reasons related to his public prominence and undertaken
with a political purpose in view."22 This definition emphasizes the
personalization of the victim, but fails to incorporate the notion of state complicity
crucial to the type of assassination which this report addresses. David Newman
and Tyll Van Geel offer a definition which contains this element. They describe
assassination as an action "condoned by a responsible official of a sovereign state
as an intentional state action expected to influence the policies of another
nation."23
These definitions contain three elements which comprise our criteria.
Taken together, these criteria are necessary and sufficient to describe an action as
an assassination within the context of the executive order. The first element is the
21Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press,
1991), 81.
^Ford, 2.
^David Newman and Tyll van Geel, "Executive Order 12333: The Risks of a
Clear Declaration of Intent," Harvard Tournal of Law and Public Policy, 1989, 434.
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authority of a state official for conducting the action. The second necessary
element is the intent to influence the policies of the targeted national or sub-
national entity. Finally, political assassination requires a victim who is specifically
identified. Operationally defined, if an official action targets an individual by
name, then it fulfills these requirements. A "bullet with a name on it," therefore,
is always an instrument of political assassination.
To summarize, this section has described the classical assassination scenario
and argued that, although this scenario has forged American perceptions, it is
insufficient for defining assassination as it appears in the ban. Indeed, since the
ban contains no definition, definitions themselves are arguably inconsequential
to a discussion of the ban. Instead, we have drawn general ideas from more
specific definitions of political assassination to establish three elements which are
necessary and sufficient to describe an action as assassination. These elements are
logical criteria for a government official operating within the assassination ban.
Two criticisms of this approach are likely. The first is that the criteria
described are too broad; they would encompass actions far beyond the scope of
those associated with the classical assassination scenario. Far from detracting
from the argument, this criticism supports the thesis of the next chapter. A
prudent government official who ventures beyond the margins which these three
elements demarcate, risks political reproach. He may choose to assume this risk.
If attacked, he may rightly argue that his actions were within the spirit of the ban.
16
The language of the ban certainly lends itself to this sort of semantic
maneuvering.
Alternatively, he may not wish to engage in this kind of risk taking at all
and define assassination in its broadest sense. In this case, inaction is inevitable.
In 1989 President Bush cited the assassination ban as the primary reason for his
decision not to commit U.S. assistance to the failed coup attempt in Panama.24
This example addresses a second likely criticism: that there is no empirical
evidence to suggest that a decision maker would adopt such a broad definition.
Bush's criteria were apparently more general that out's. Although the coup
plotters had no intention of killing Noriega, the fact that the coup placed Noriega
in mortal danger was enough to deter Bush.
The next Chapter analyzes the Yamamoto killing and the Phoenix program
as examples of American experiences with assassination as state policy. Both
cases pre-date the assassination ban and seem only remotely related to our
classical perception of assassination. Yet if the reader accepts the proposition that
a government official must consider criteria similar to those which this section
proposes, then it is clear that the capabilities embodied in these case studies
would be difficult to reproduce in today's political milieu.
24Pat Towell, "Administration Seeks Leeway in Helping Future Coups,"
Defense and Foreien Policy, 21 October 1989, 2812.
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II. ASSASSINATION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The United States was created by a war of rebellion and united by the
nineteenth century's costliest war of unification. Geographical expansion made
it a superpower. Protecting that status has frequently necessitated deadly force.
Despite this necessity, assassination has never been a prominent tactic of U.S.
policy. Throughout America's violent colonial period, for instance, there were no
lethal assaults against representatives of the British crown. 1 Even during the
watershed years of the Civil War, when General Sherman's announcement that
"war is hell" became doctrine,2 enemy generals and political leaders were never
recognized as legitimate targets. As this chapter argues, there are only four
episodes in American history which could be considered under this rubric.
So why should we study a virtual null set? Four occurrences appearing over
a period exceeding two hundred years may be explained as outliers, historical
anomolies. But this explanation is unsatisfactory. These cases, related by their
temporal proximity to one another, represent a trend. A thirty year span, from
1943 to 1972, contains all four data points. Considered on a graph of American
history, these "outliers" form a significant spike indeed.
'Ford, 347.
2See Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1973), 128-152.
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We have already discussed two of these cases: the Castro and Lumumba
attempts. Some of the nuances of these cases appear throughout this report. This
chapter considers two additional cases and proposes that Operation Vengeance,
the 1943 killing of Admiral Yamamoto, and the Phoenix program, the campaign
to destroy the Viet Cong political infrastructure during the Vietnam war, are also
cases of political assassination.
Some may argue against placing these examples under the same rubric as the
Castro and Lumumba cases. After all, they both transpired in wartime. Although
not all acts of violence in wartime are legally or ethically permissible, killing is
widely considered to be legitimate. This objection is further validated by the fact
that the 1976 assassination ban did not restrict decision makers during World War
II or the Vietnam War.
But historical analysis permits flexibility. This chapter bends chronology in
order to consider the Yamamoto and Phoenix cases in the context of the
assassination ban. Considered from this artificial perspective, it is clear that
America's experience with assassination is more extensive that many would
suspect. Applying the criteria of Chapter One to the Yamamoto and Phoenix
cases demonstrates that the executive order not only proscribes the morally
repugnant actions which were the targets of the prohibition, but may also call into
question related capabilities which the United States may not wish to surrender.
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A. YAMAMOTO
In the first days after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the operation, declared on Tokyo Radio: "I
am looking forward to dictating peace to the United States in the White House
in Washington."3 Yamamoto's boast may have instilled confidence in a nation
embarking on an uncertain future; it certainly fueled the antipathy of the
American war planners who issued his death warrant and the aviators who
claimed his life. Despite its conventional aspects, the killing of Admiral
Yamamoto was clearly America's first documented experience with assassination
as a warfighting instrument.
1. Background
Notwithstanding his haughty rhetoric after the attack, Yamamoto,
commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, had resisted from the outset
those forces in Japan that sought war with the United States. He knew well that
Japan, despite an intensive shipbuilding program, could not sustain a war with
the United States for more than a year or two.4 Even while he planned the Pearl
Harbor attack, he continued to privately and publicly oppose the war. In a talk
given at a primary school reunion in Tokyo on 18 September 1941, Yamamoto
warned that Japan could not defeat the United States. "Therefore, she
3Isoroku Yamamoto quoted in R. Cargill Hall, Lightning over Bougainville,




should not fight the United States."5 But as events moved Japan and the United
States inexorably toward war, Yamamoto commented, "If you insist on my going
ahead, we can run wild for six months or a year, but I can guarantee nothing as
to what will happen after that."6
One year had elapsed since Pearl Harbor, and a succession of intense sea
and air battles, culminating in the Japanese withdrawal from Guadalcanal,
confirmed the admiral's prophesy-Japan was now engaged in a war of attrition.
On 13 April 1943, after weeks of conferences analyzing details and reasons for the
Guadalcanal retreat, Yamamoto planned a series of morale building visits to the
Japanese navy's frontline bases in the Shortland area, off the southern tip of
Bougainville Island. Commander Yasuji Watanabe, his staff administrative officer
and friend, worked out the plans for the journey, and sent a top secret radio
message to the various base commanders involved:
On 18 April Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will inspect Ballale, Shortland,
and Buin as follows: Depart Rabaul 0600 in medium attack plane escorted by
six fighters, arrive Ballale 0800. Depart at once in subchaser to arrive Shortland
0840. Depart Shortland 0945 in subchaser to arrive Ballale 1030. Depart Ballale
by plane to arrive Buin at 1110. Lunch at Buin. Depart by plane to arrive
Rabaul 1540/
5Yamamoto quoted in John Dean Potter, Yamamoto (New York: The Viking
Press, 1965), 59-60.
6Yamamoto quoted in Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral (Tokyo:
Kodansha International Ltd., 1979), 232.
7Cited in Hall, 41.
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A radio interception post at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians received the
coded signal just as promptly as the intended recipients. Dutch Harbor relayed
the message to three special processing units located in Washington, Pearl Harbor,
and Melbourne, Australia. Because of the great variety of addressees, Watanabe's
message immediately alerted the communications intelligence analysts. One
analyst, Marine Lt. Col. Alva "Red" Lasswell, reportedly leapt to his feet and
exclaimed, "We've hit the jackpot!"8 All hands worked feverishly to decipher the
message.
Lasswell hand carried the deciphered message to the office of Edwin
Layton, Admiral Nimitz' s intelligence officer. Layton took it directly to Nimitz.
In a discussion of the contents, Nimitz asked Layton, "Do we try to get him?"
2. The Mission
The decision to shoot down Yamamoto's plane was fraught with subtle
tactical and strategic considerations. Reacting to this intelligence could have
alerted the enemy that the Allies had broken his code.9 One had to consider the
many possible political repercussions as well. Admiral Nimitz consulted with
Washington and received the go-ahead from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
to conduct Operation Vengeance. 10 Nimitz notified Vice Admiral William
8
Ibid., 42.
9Indeed, British intelligence officials, who did not learn of the plan until after
its completion, protested the action for this very reason.
10Some sources suggest that Knox consulted with President Roosevelt as well.
There is supporting as well as contradictory evidence for this position. See Hall,
43.
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Halsey, commander, South Pacific Area, to proceed with the interception, adding
a personal message: "Good luck and good hunting."
Halsey, after consultations, decided to employ the Army Air Force's P-38
fighter for the mission. Since the P-38 did not have the range to conduct the
mission, they were specially fit with long-range fuel drop tanks which arrived in
Guadalcanal from Australia on the evening before the operation. Halsey selected
Major John W. Mitchell, commander of 339 Squadron in Guadalcanal, as mission
flight leader. Mitchell received a top secret telegram.
Washington Top Secret. Secretary Navy to Fighter Control Henderson. Admiral
Yamamoto accompanied chief of staff and seven general officers Imperial Navy
including surgeon grand fleet left Truk this morning eight hours for their trip
inspection Bougainville bases stop . . . Squadron 339 P-38 must at all costs reach
and destroy Yamamoto and staff morning April eighteen stop . . . intelligence
stresses admiral's extreme punctuality stop President attaches extreme
importance this operation stop. 11
Mitchell selected an intercept point over Bougainville. He calculated a 7:20
a.m. take-off time in order to be in position ready for the attack at precisely 9:35
a.m. He designated four men as shooters to engage Yamamoto's flight: First
Lieutenants Thomas Lanphier, Rex Barber, Besby Holmes and Ray Hine. 12
Mitchell and thirteen others would fly top cover.
"Cited in Potter, 303-304.
12Lanphier and Barber, who were scheduled to rotate, were held over for this
specific mission because of their demonstrated aggressiveness. Holmes and Hine
replaced First Lieutenants James McLanahan and Joseph Moore, whom Mitchell
had originally selected as shooters. McLanahan's P-38 blew a tire on takeoff, and
Moore found he could not draw fuel from his drop tank.
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The first P-38 took off at 7:20 a.m. to the minute. After an uneventful, 410
mile flight just above the thirty foot waves, First Lieutenant Douglas Canning
broke radio silence for the first time: "Bogeys, 11 o'clock high." Yamamoto's
flight, which consisted of two Betty bombers cruising at 4,500 feet and six Type
32 naval Zeros (Zekes) at 6,000 feet, was right on schedule.
Lanphier and Barber rose to meet the bombers. 13 They had closed to
within one mile of the Japanese flight before the Japanese pilots spotted the P-38s
beneath them, dropped their fuel tanks, and dove to repel the American fighters.
The two bombers streaked toward the safety of the jungle, leveling out at 200 feet,
just above the tree-tops. Lanphier nosed over at 400 m.p.h. and engaged
Yamamoto's plane with cannon and machine-gun fire. The bomber's starboard
engine burst into flames. As Lanphier released a second burst of fire, the
Admiral's plane crashed into the jungle, bounced once and exploded.
In order to determine the significance of Operation Vengeance, we must
first clarify the parameters for success. If the killing of Yamamoto was designed
primarily to eliminate an exceptional military threat or, as the mission's name
suggests, revenge, then the mission was a resounding success. Admiral
Yamamoto, the architect of Pearl Harbor was dead. 14 Halsey sent a personal
13Holmes's fuel tank failed to drop. He turned southeast along the coast
performing violent maneuvers to shake it free, accompanied by his wingman, Ray
Hine.
14A doctor's post mortem revealed that Yamamoto had been shot through the
head and shoulder, and was probably dead prior to impact. With the exception
of Hine, all of the American pilots escaped the vengeful Zekes with only minor
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message to Henderson Field:
Congratulations Major Mitchell and his hunters. Sounds as though one of the
ducks in their bag was a peacock. 15
Lanphier was promoted to the rank of captain, awarded the Navy Cross, and
received a personal congratulations from President Roosevelt.
If we assume, on the other hand, that the ultimate goal of any mission was
to win the war, the task of determining the success or failure of this operation
becomes more difficult. Killing Yamamoto may have won the allies a military or
psychological advantage. But this conclusion is difficult to defend with any
certainty. It is also possible that the death of a beloved leader in this manner may
have increased Japan's will to resist. Japanese propagandists, who had claimed
from the outset of the war that the only options of the Japanese people were to
fight or die, could have exploited this event. Operation Vengeance seemed to
confirm that the allies were taking no prisoners.
3. Was Yamamoto Assassinated?
Determining whether Operation Vengeance was an assassination depends
completely upon one's definition. This is evident in the argument of Paul B.
Woodruff, chairman of the philosophy department at the University of Texas at
Austin, who contends that the mission was not an assassination since certain
damage to their aircraft. Least damaged was Lanphier's plane, with only two
bullet holes in the horizontal stabilizer. See Potter, 309.
15William Halsey quoted in Potter, 308.
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ingredients were not present. 16 In an assassination, according to Woodruff, the
action must take place outside the theater of war by non-uniformed personnel
behind the lines who gained access by stealth to an enemy leader (who may also
be non-uniformed) and killed him.
Woodruff takes his definition from the pages of the Castro scenario. In the
absence of the assassination ban, this definition would be adequate, and
Woodruffs conclusion that the mission was not an assassination would be correct.
The planners of Operation Vengeance were not bound by the executive order.
But the government official, who is constrained by an assassination ban which
contains no definition and makes no distinction between times of peace and times
of war, cannot afford to circumscribe the meaning of assassination so narrowly.
The Yamamoto mission targeted a specific person—not forces, weapons or
installations. Officials of the U.S. government hand picked the "assassins" and
specifically modified their weapons. The execution order was issued from at least
as high as the office of the Secretary of the Navy. Operation Vengeance was
political assassination, if not in the classical sense, then in the context of the
assassination ban.
B. THE PHOENIX PROGRAM
The U.S. pacification effort in Vietnam evolved from the recognition that
firepower alone would not defeat the communist insurgency. The Phoenix
16For a detailed presentation of Woodruff's Argument, see Hall, 52.
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program was perhaps the most controversial element of pacification. 17 Phoenix
was an American-conceived anti-infrastructure effort. It was an integrated
program designed to use sound intelligence to track and "neutralize" 18
specifically targeted cadre. To some, it was a program of secret murder.
1. Origins
It was never clear to American war planners whether the center of the war
lay in Hanoi or in the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. The enemy,
however, understood from the outset the paramount importance of population
control. The primary thrust of the communist effort, therefore, was to extend a
clandestine presence throughout the countryside. It accomplished this with the
development of a shadow political infrastructure, a miniature government
reproduced down to the village level throughout South Vietnam. 19 The
American bureaucracy dubbed this presence "the Viet Cong Infrastructure" (VCI).
Unlike the military,20 the CIA was quick to acknowledge the importance
of the political infrastructure. By the end of 1967, the government of South
17
In mythology, phoenix was a beautiful bird with the ability to rise from
death and defeat into the glory of rebirth and victory. No allusion, however, was
intended. Phoenix was the best English approximation of the Vietnamese
mythical bird Phung Hoang which represented grace, virtue, peace, and concord.
Both Phoenix and Phung Hoang refer to the same program.
18Phoenix defined neutralized as rallied, captured, or killed.
19Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990),
1.
20General Wesmoreland, who served as COMUSMACV (Commander, U.S.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) from June 1964 to June 1968, made it
clear that he regarded the VCI as secondary to main-force units.
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Vietnam (GVN) adopted a CIA-conceived program aimed at eliminating the VCI
through a direct attack on targeted members. 21 This program was originally
called the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) Program. The
purpose of ICEX was to "coordinate and give new impetus to U.S. and GVN
operations, both intelligence collection and processing and action operations,
directed toward elimination of the Viet Cong infrastructure."22 ICEX was an
intermediate phase, a trial and error period. As had been the plan from the
outset, ICEX evolved into Phoenix.
Ironically, it was the enemy that finally made the fledgling Phoenix
program a reality. The Tet Offensive jolted South Vietnamese President Nguyen
Van Thieu into realizing that it had been the existence of the Viet Cong
infrastructure that had allowed the offensive to occur.23 Thieu officially
endorsed the Phoenix program on 1 July 1968 in Presidential Decree Number 280-
a/TT/SL.
Articles 3 and 5 of the decree are important. Article 3 defined who was or
was not a member of the VCI. "The Viet Cong Infrastructure is all Viet Cong,
political and administrative organizations established by the Communist Party
21Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) was another element of the effort to eliminate the
VCI. Chieu Hoi sought to persuade members of the Viet Cong political apparatus
to surrender through various rewards and protection against punishment.
"MACV Directive 381-41, "Military Intelligence: Coordination and
Exploitation for Attack on the VC Infrastructure (C); Short Title: ICEX," 9 July
1967, cited in Andrade, 61.
^Andrade, 72.
28
which goes under the name People's Revolutionary Party, from the cities to the
countryside."24 Specifically excluded from this set were military units.
Technically, the targets of the Phoenix program were civilians.
Phoenix was a central clearinghouse for intelligence collation and targeting
information; it contained no mechanism for actually hunting down the VCI.
Article 5 established the action arm of Phoenix. The primary organizations
assigned to the task of conducting anti-infrastructure operations were the National
Police and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), indigenous paramilitary
groups established by the CIA in 1964. The decision to emphasize police efforts
owed much to British experience in Malaya where the British colonial government
employed the police effectively.25 Very few American troops actively
participated in Phoenix operations. Notable exceptions were U.S. Navy SEALs
(Sea, Air, and Land teams).
2. Effectiveness
Evaluating the effectiveness of Phoenix is problematic. American planners
generally relied on neutralization quota figures. Results were tallied and sent to
Saigon, where the verdict of success or failure was based on numbers.26 Judging
24MACV/MACCORDS, "Phung Hoang Standard Operation Procedure," 27 July
1968, 3, cited in Andrade, 73.




by neutralization figures alone, it would seem that the program was successful.
From 1968 through July 1972, a total of 81,740 had been neutralized.27
This technique for passing judgment on the success or failure of the
Phoenix program provides only a partial picture. The enemy provided the best
barometer of the program's effectiveness. Captured enemy documents and
interrogation reports indicate the profound hardships that the Phoenix program
was placing on the VCI specifically and the enemy effort in general. One
captured document outlined the Phoenix program in one region and noted that:
At present, personnel of the Phoenix intelligence organization are the most
dangerous enemies of the Revolution in suburban and rural areas. They have
harassed us more than any other group and have caused us many difficulties.28
Local communist cadres were ordered to "capture and annihilate" anyone
associated with the Phoenix program "at all costs."29 The Viet Cong assigned
special teams to assassinate Phoenix personnel. Unlike Phoenix, these teams
made no attempt to capture their targets.30 Even today, Vietnamese officials
continue to maintain that Phoenix was the one program they truly feared. One
government official commented that:
28
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27See Ibid., Table A-l.
"Phung Hoang 1970 End of Year Report," 11 May 1975, 45, cited in Ibid.,
29Stephen T. Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future
(Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1970) 21.
30Andrade, 265.
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there were only two occasions when we were almost entirely wiped out. The
first was in 1957-58, when Ngo Ding Diem had much success in eliminating our
infrastructure . . . [The second was] your pacification program which was
very successful, especially Phung Hoang. Your concepts were generally good.
It was the implementation that often went wrong.31
Criticism regarding the program's implementation generally falls into three
areas. First, while the figures cited above may seem quantitatively impressive,
many question the quality of those VCI neutralized. In 1968, for example, less
than one percent of the neutralized VCI held positions of top leadership.32 The
years 1970-1971 saw no significant changes, with less than three percent of all VCI
neutralized holding positions above the district level.33
A second criticism is that most of the VCI neutralizations resulted from
conventional military sweeps rather than specific targeting. The Police Special
Branch (PSB), the intelligence-gathering arm of the National Police, failed to
generate the intelligence necessary to target individual VCI.34 More than
anything, this was due to incompetence and corruption within the PSB. 35 It is
significant, however, that other programs within Phoenix, the PRUs and the
31
"We Were in Desperate Shape," Time, 29 February 1988, 17.
32Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz, Lessons from an Unconventional
War (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 104.
^Not all analysts agree with this criticism. Indeed, some argue that it was
more important to go after low- and middle-level cadre since these were the
individuals who were in direct contact with the population. For a detailed




SEALs most notably, managed to rise above the problems of poor intelligence by
creating their own networks.
A third problem which plagued Phoenix was the inadequacy of the
criminal justice system. Innocent people sat in jail for weeks and sometimes
months before they were interrogated, providing a willing pool of converts to the
Viet Cong cause. On the other hand, the average sentence given to proven VCI
was less than one year.36 Furthermore, the detention system, which allowed VCI
suspects to run loose among common criminals, provided hardcore VC with an
ideal opportunity to recruit new members.
3. Phoenix and Assassination
In the final analysis, Phoenix was a failure. The infrastructure survived.
The essence of the Phoenix failure, however, lay not in these shortcomings.
Phoenix arrived too late in the war. Given time, Phoenix could have overcome
its problems. Ultimately it was perceptions of the American public which killed
Phoenix. Assassination became a label which, to this day, clings to the Phoenix
program. After the massacre of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai came to public
attention in November of 1969, the anti-war movement, the media and Congress
focussed full attention on the allegations that Phoenix was a program of
assassination. By 1972, rather than suffer additional public opinion damage,
American officials opted to recommend dissolution of the program.
%Andrade, 202.
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Was the Phoenix program legitimate conflict management or a program
of planned assassination? Both descriptions contain elements of truth. As we
saw in the previous example, the distinction between assassination and legitimate
war fighting has little meaning in wartime. The distinction is even less clear in
an unconventional war where the lines between combatants and noncombatants
are unclear.
However, when considered in the context of the vague assassination ban
which today's policy makers must regard, the charge that the Phoenix program
engaged in assassination is justifiable. Specific targeting was the essence of the
Phoenix attack. Despite emphasis placed on capturing VCI, Phoenix ran
operations which targeted specific individuals-operations which often resulted
in the demise of those targeted. After a successful raid a SEAL lieutenant told a
reporter:
We like to grab people. Thafs of real value. Killing them does no good. Any
time we make a hit we're there to take them alive. But once we're seen, we're
compromised. Our primary mission ceases and we turn to our secondary
mission-killing VC.37
In fact, killing accounted for nearly one third of all neutralizations from 1968
through the end of July 1972.38 Furthermore, these killings were not always




"Web-Foot Warriors," Pacific Stars and Stripes, September 1967.
8This percentage was calculated from statistics provided by Andrade, Table
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hearings if he could deny that Phoenix had ever engaged in the premeditated
killing of specific individuals, William Colby, who took control of the U.S.
pacification effort in 1968, replied, "No, I could not say that."39
"Assassination" does not apply to a man killed in an ambush. That is war.
But because the Phoenix program took a rifle shot approach, specifically
identifying its targets, assassination was the charge. "The distinction seemed to
be," writes Dale Andrade, "that if the attackers did not know the identity of those
they killed it was war; if they did, it was assassination."40 This distinction,
although seemingly arbitrary, fits well into our criteria for assassination vis-a-vis
the executive order.
C CONCLUSIONS
The warfighting imperatives associated with Operation Vengeance and the
Phoenix program lend legitimacy to these efforts. Operation Vengeance was
strictly a military mission. Yamamoto was in uniform in a military plane when
U.S. military aircraft attacked him overtly in a theater of war. Phoenix was also
a wartime program. Although its victims were technically non-military, they had
a decidedly military and malevolent function. The Castro case lacks this sense of
legitimacy. Although some of the most critical moments of the Cold War
centered on Cuba, the U.S. relationship with Cuba was nominally peaceful.
39William Colby, Lost Victory, (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), 332.
40Andrade, 284.
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Castro often wears a uniform, but he is a civilian. His would-be assassins had
no military affiliation, and their techniques most closely approximated those of
criminals.
Vengeance and Phoenix differ not only in degree from the Castro and
Lumumba examples, but also in kind. Nevertheless, the imprecise assassination
ban fails to differentiate. Should the United States continue to embrace such a
clumsy restriction?
President Ford's decision to issue the original executive order can hardly be
criticized. So repugnant were the revelations of the plots to assassinate Castro
and Lumumba that they threatened to seriously damage America's self-image,
already reeling from the blows of Vietnam and Watergate. Ford had to act
decisively not only to avert future indiscretions, but also to restore American
credibility throughout the world.
But in his urgency, Ford may have thrown out some babies with the Cuban
bath water. There are moral dimensions to American foreign policy. Certainly
the Castro and Lumumba examples represent an abandonment of these values.
But the Phoenix and Yamamoto cases provide examples of capabilities which the
United States may not wish to forfeit-capabilities it may have lost as collateral
damage of the assassination ban.
Chapter Four examines more closely anti-infrastructure operations, military
leadership targeting, and other capabilities which the U.S. may have chosen to
forgo. But first we will recover our chronological perspective. The assassination
35
ban arrived on the scene of American international relations four years after the
demise of the Phoenix program. Chapter Three discusses how the prohibition
came to be.
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III. DEMOCRACY OVERREACTS: THE EVOLUTION OF THE BAN
Harry S. Truman once commented: "You see, the way a free government
works, there's got to be a housecleaning every now and then." Seymour Hersh's
story about CIA indiscretions heralded such a housecleaning. This chapter details
over a year of investigations which followed the Hersh report, a period which
Loch Johnson designated as the "season of inquiry."1 Although Hersh did not
directly reveal the assassination plots, the inextricable relationship between the
media, public opinion and the assassination ban, makes his story a natural
stepping off point for this discussion.
President Ford was the first to act on Hersh's story. On January 4, 1975, Ford
appointed Nelson Rockefeller, then Vice President, to head an eight-member
commission (the Rockefeller Commission) to investigate the CIA. 2 Sensitive to
the delicate nature of the testimony, the commission conducted its investigation
in private and reported directly to the President.
William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) saw Ford's investigation
as an orchestrated attempt by the President to appease public demands for an
]Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry (Lexington, KY: The University Press
of Kentucky, 1985), 11.
2The Commission included: Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller (R), John
Connor (D), C. Douglas Dillon (R), Erwin N. Griswold (R), Ronald Reagan (R),
GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Edgar F. Shannon (D), and Joseph Lane Kirkland (D).
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investigation while protecting embarrassing secrets from the scrutiny of a
Congressional inquiry. Colby knew that Ford would not be able to contain the
momentum. "I was convinced that the blue ribbon commission would not be the
end of the matter," said Colby, "and that the President's carefully circumscribed
investigation of CIA's domestic affairs would not stop Congress from conducting
its own probe."3
Colby recognized that he was entering into a fight for the survival of the CIA,
a battle which the agency would have to fight alone. He also determined that
prolonged, involuntary exposure of agency misconduct could destroy the agency
and that voluntary exposure might save it.4
Over objections from the White House, Colby "came clean" about the CIA's past
mistakes, making it clear all along that the agency had since reformed.
I discovered that I was being somewhat too open and candid for some people's
tastes. After my second or third appearance, the Commission's Chairman, Vice
President Rockefeller, drew me aside into his office at the Executive Office
Building and said in his most charming manner, "Bill, do you really have to
present all this material to us? We realize that there are secrets that you fellows
need to keep and so nobody here is going to take it amiss if you feel that there
are some questions you can't answer quite as fully as you seem to feel you
have to." I got the message quite unmistakably, and I didn't like it. 5
3William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 399.
4Ranelagh, 588.
5Colby and Forbath, 400.
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It appears that Colby had designed a fait accompli. Shortly after the
Commission had begun, Colby volunteered that the CIA had been involved in
plans to assassinate certain foreign leaders. This information soon became
public.6 Now, in order to attack the CIA, Ford and Congress would have to
attack the reputations of former presidents and members of Congress,
Republicans and Democrats alike.7
On May 25, 1975, the Rockefeller Commission concluded its investigation. The
Commission had compiled 2,900 pages of sworn testimony from fifty-one
witnesses. The 299-page report substantiated the Hersh report of massive CIA
spying on U.S. citizens. The Rockefeller Commission was also the first officially
to acknowledge the assassination plots. The Commission chose, however, not to
investigate the issue further, despite Ford's earlier order to extend its life by two
months for this purpose. On March 10, 1975, the White House press secretary
announced that these allegations might be better dealt with by Congress, with its
"broader charter."8
6Ford himself was responsible for leaking the assassination plots. On January
16, 1975, Ford confessed to the publisher of the New York Times
,
Arthur Ochs
Sulzberger, that the Rockefeller Commission's mandate was strictly limited to CIA
activities within the United States and he didn't want anybody on it who might
stray into the recesses of CIA history and stumble on the assassination plots.
Although the New York Times chose to sit on the story, the story leaked. On
February 28, CBS television news correspondent Daniel Schorr reported Ford's
blunder on the Evening News.
7Ranelagh, 631.
8Colby and Forbath, 401.
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A. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
"The executive branch cannot, with sufficient credibility, investigate itself,"
said Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho). He added that he hoped that the
Rockefeller Commission would complete its investigation quickly and make its
record available to Congress for "the more comprehensive congressional
investigations to come."9
Thus the Senate established the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by Frank Church. The
House established a similar committee, but quickly encountered difficulties.
1. The Nedzi and Pike Committees
The House reacted to Hersh's revelations by establishing a Select
Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Lucien N. Nedzi (Democrat, Michigan) in
February 1975. But the committee soon collapsed on itself when liberal
Democrats on the committee objected to Nedzi's chairmanship. The objection
was raised as a resulted from the disclosure that the agency had secretly briefed
Nedzi on activities subsequently investigated by the Rockefeller Commission, and
that he had taken no action. 10 Unable to resolve its differences, the panel was
dissolved and not reconstituted until July.
^
"Washington Post, 16 March 1975.
10
"Central Intelligence Agency: Appointment of Presidential and
Congressional Committees of Investigation," Keesings Contemporary Archives,
1975, 27260.
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The House transferred the job to a new committee with the same name and
mandate, but a slightly different membership. Now under the leadership of Otis
Pike (Democrat, New York), the House Committee focused mainly on the costs
and risks of the intelligence effort and on the quality of its product. But the Pike
Committee fared only slightly better than its predecessor. In part, this was due
to lack of cooperation from the executive branch. As a result of the perception
that the committee had made its mind up to secure the dismantling of the agency
before it heard the evidence, President Ford was particularly miserly with respect
to Pike's demands for documents and information. 11
A clear majority in the House (246 members) voted not to publish the
committee's report until it was censored by the White House. A copy of one of
the drafts of a full report, however, leaked to CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr,
who then had parts of it published in the Village Voice . The House spent much
of the rest of the year investigating itself. 12
The House Committee's work thus ended in great controversy; its most
lasting legacy would be a backlash reaction against congressional involvement in
intelligence matters. The question of the CIA assassination plots was never
investigated. In July 1977, the House finally voted to create a permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. The House Committee had been too divided to be
nRanelagh, 594.
12John M. Oseth, Regulation and U.S. Intelligence Operations (Lexington, KY:
The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 59.
41
effective. The Senate Committee, on the other hand, was well organized, well
staffed and abundantly funded.
2. The Church Committee
On January 21, 1975, Rhode Island Senator John O. Pastore introduced
Senate Resolution 21 establishing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:
In recent weeks and in recent months there have been charges and counter
charges spelled out on the front page of every newspaper in this country. The
matter has been discussed over television and radio. The people of America are
confused. They are asking themselves, "What is actually happening to these
organizations which are essential for the security and survival of our great
Nation?"
In order to clear the air, in order to cleanse whatever abuses there have been
in the past, so that we can recite, once and for all, the proper parameters within
which they can function, I am afraid we will do irreparable harm to the security
and survival of the country unless we do this. 13
Following two days of debate, Senate Resolution 21 passed eighty-two to four. 14
The five members selected by the GOP for the proposed eleven-man
committee included John Tower (Texas), Barry Goldwater (Arizona), Charles
Mathias (Maryland), Richard S. Schweiker (Pennsylvania), and Howard H. Baker,
Jr. (Tennessee). The six Democrats chosen were Frank Church (Idaho), Philip A.
Hart (Michigan), Walter F. Mondale (Minnesota), Walter D. Huddleston
13Congressional Record, 21 January 1975, 596F.
14Four southern conservatives voted against the creation of the panel: Jesse
A. Helms (Republican, North Carolina), William L. Scott (Republican, Virginia),
Strom Thurmond (Republican, South Carolina), and Herman E. Talmadge
(Democrat, Georgia).
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(Kentucky), Robert Morgan (North Carolina), and Gary Hart (Colorado). Church
convinced Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to appoint him as chairman. 15
Henceforth, the committee became known as the Church Committee. Tower was
Minority Leader Hugh Scotfs choice for the vice-chairmanship.
The committee membership represented a broad selection. The ages of the
members ranged from thirty-eight (Gary Hart) to sixty-six (Barry Goldwater).
Although southern Senators were in the majority, all geographic regions were
represented. There were, however, two notable skews in the committee
membership. First, past voting records indicated that there were decidedly more
liberals. Only Tower, Goldwater, Baker, and Morgan had conservative voting
records. 16 The second significant imbalance was that the committee was
comprised of seven junior members. Three members, Huddleston, Morgan, and
Gary Hart, were freshmen. Four others, Mondale, Baker, Mathias, and Schweiker,
were only in their second terms. The implications of the lack of seniority in the
committee is discussed later.
Although not a part of the committee's statutory mandate, the allegation
of CIA assassination plots became its priority. There was concern among the staff
15According to the Christian Science Monitor (3 February 1975), Church
"almost knocked down Mansfield's door to get [the chairmanship]." Church's
presidential ambitions for 1976 or 1980 were no secret, and chairmanship was an
important honor.
16Based on the voting scale developed by the Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA), a liberal group that follows and evaluates congressional voting patterns.
See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 December 1974, 8-9.
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and in the media that taking on the assassination probe would divert the attention
of the committee away from the more important issues which had triggered the
inquiry in the first place. One key staffer suggested that the assassination issue
was a CIA setup intended to focus the committee's interest away from other
subjects. 17 Gregory Treverton, another Church Committee staffer, joked that "the
only successful CIA assassination plot has been against the Church Committee
itself."
18 But Church saw the subject of assassination as extremely important and
worthy of in depth examination. "Had we handled [the assassination report] with
any less care," said Senator Church, "we would have lost all credibility, since this
was by far the most infamous and extreme action taken by the CIA." 19
In order to expedite the probe into the assassination plots, Church
established a special Subcommittee on Assassination, comprising himself, Tower,
Gary Hart, and a half-dozen staff aides. Specifically, the subcommittee sought to
answer four questions regarding the assassination plots. First, were United States
officials involved in any way in plots to assassinate foreign leaders? Second, did
United States officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly
contributed to the killing of foreign leaders? Third, where there was involvement
by United States officials in assassination plots, were such activities authorized
17Johnson, 55.
18Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
Publishers, 1987), 24.
19Taylor Branch, "The Trial of the CIA," New York Times Magazine, 12
September 1976, 115.
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and, if so, at what levels? Finally, if not authorized, were the assassination
activities perceived by those involved as lawful?20
3. Church Committee Findings
Over the objections of the Ford administration and three committee
Republicans (Tower, Baker, and Goldwater), the Church Committee released its
findings in an interim report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders . The report detailed CIA involvement in assassination attempts against
five foreign leaders.21 This section summarizes those findings.
The committee determined that no United States official was ever involved
in the killing of a foreign leader. But it was not for lack of trying. The report
concluded that the CIA had directly plotted the deaths of two leaders, Premiers
Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. Three others assassinations, General Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam
and Chilean General Rene Schneider, were investigated, but the committee could
find no direct link between their deaths and the CIA.22
The committee also endeavored to determine the extent of presidential
^Congress, Senate 1975, 4.
21Goldwater/ s rejection of the Church committee's decision to make the interim
report public was scathing. He called the publication of the report a "spectacle
of public self-flagellation" that would denigrate our reputation abroad and "tell
the world we are retreating into isolationism." See Johnson, 132.
In a compromise with the administration, the committee agreed to delete the
names of twenty of the officers. See Treverton, 244.
-See Congress, Senate 1975, 4-6.
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knowledge and involvement in the plots. This point had profound implications.
If the CIA conceived and conducted these operations without authority from the
serving president or his immediate lieutenants, then the agency was indeed a
"rogue elephant on a rampage," as Church had earlier charged.23 If the orders
did originate in the White House, then the image of the presidency itself was on
trial.
Establishing the chain-of-command was among the committee's greatest
challenges. The events in question occurred up to fifteen years ago; memories
had faded. With one exception, they occurred during the administrations of
presidents who were now dead. Other senior administration officials were also
dead. Among those still alive, some were clearly guided by a sense of loyalty to
their former bosses.24 Others were, no doubt, guided by a sense of self-
preservation. Finally, the committee was dealing with a highly sensitive topic in
a highly secretive organization. The written record was necessarily thin. Even
if the White House was explicitly in command of these operations, there would
be no documentary evidence giving explicit commands.
Much of the testimony which the committee heard was contradictory. The
picture which they pieced together was fragmentary. In the end, the committee
had to confess that it had no conclusive evidence that the CIA had indeed




behaved as a "rogue elephant," nor could it provide conclusive evidence that any
president had ever directly ordered an assassination attempt.25
But the smoking gun was provocative. Although the evidence was
inconclusive, there were indications of presidential authority which may have
passed the test of "reasonable doubt." The report found "reasonable inference"
that Eisenhower authorized the Lumumba assassination. It also suggested that
Robert Kennedy, and possibly the President himself, may have known of attempts
to kill Castro after the fact and did not discourage future attempts.
The committee's response to the incomplete record was to leave the
question of authority hanging. But the committee felt it had identified vital
problems within the executive branch: operational authorization procedures were
so secretive and unclear that it would have been possible to set in motion a plan
to assassinate a foreign leader without explicit presidential approval.
Furthermore, administration officials failed to rule out assassination as a tool of
foreign policy, to make it clear to their subordinates that assassination was
impermissible, or to inquire further after receiving indications that assassination
was being considered.26
Two obstacles proved particularly confounding in establishing what the
White House knew about the assassination plots and when it knew it: "plausible




denial" and the use of euphemism. Establishing "plausible denial" ensures that
certain acts are perpetrated in such a way that the U.S. Government cannot be
blamed. This "doctrine" had been expanded from its initial purpose to the
internal decision making process. The CIA had applied the concept of "plausible
denial" to insulate higher officials, particularly the President, from knowledge,
and hence responsibility for a compromised covert operation. This placed elected
officials on the periphery of the decision-making process.. In his testimony,
Richard Helms told the Church Committee:
I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep these things
out of the Oval Office . . . nobody wants to embarrass a President of the United
States by discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence.27
In the language of the interim report, this doctrine represented "the antithesis of
accountability."28
One technique to ensure "plausible denial" was to use euphemism in
discussions with senior officials about assassination. This practice was best
summarized by Senator Mathias during the testimony of Richard Helms:29
Mathias: Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A. Beckett was
proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, "who will rid me of this
man." He didn't say to somebody, "go out and murder him." He said, "who
will rid me of this man," and let it go at that.






Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem.
Mathias: You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?
Helms: I think it does, sir.
According to Richard Bissell, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) at the
time of the first plots, "there was a reluctance to spread, even on an oral record,
some aspects of these operations."30 As a result, "assassination," "murder" and
"kill" were often replaced by "get rid of," "neutralize" and "eliminate."
Euphemism created an environment ripe for misunderstanding. They precipitated
vague orders with unpredictable responses. In Mathias's allusion, King Henry
later claimed that he had not ordered the killing and that he had been
misunderstood. In the haze of euphemism, then, it is possible that presidential
authorization was assumed, but never actually given.
Another uncertainty resulted from "floating authorizations." Once approval
for a covert action was given, the CIA "floated" this approval from year to year
and administration to administration, without explicit renewal. This was common
practice even within the agency itself. For example, John McCone, successor to
Allen Dulles as DCI, was never told of agency ties to the Mafia. Dulles's






With respect to the assassination issue, policy output ran contrary to the
rhetoric. Senator Goldwater had flatly refused to sign the Church Committee's
final report because of what he considered "their unbearably self-righteous,
moralizing tone."32 Yet in the final analysis, Congress enacted no legislation
prohibiting assassination. President Ford, on the other hand, championed the
need for a strong CIA throughout the investigations. Yet Ford's policy decision
profoundly influenced U.S. capability.
The Church Committee had recommended that Congress enact new charters
for the CIA and other intelligence agencies to prevent a recurrence of past abuses.
It specifically condemned the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy and
recommended that political assassinations be prohibited by statute.33 Senator
Huddleston introduced such a comprehensive charter. If passed, the National
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, S. 2525, would have specifically
prohibited the assassination of foreign officials in peacetime.34 S. 2525 was never
passed.
32Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987), 45.
33Congress, Senate 1975, 257.
^Stephen Dycus, Arthur L Berney, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-
Hansen, National Security Law (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1991), 322.
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Indeed, the legislative legacy of the Church Committee was meager.35
Congress enacted no legislation forbidding assassination. Some members
questioned the wisdom of a flat ban on assassinations. Despite his pervasively
moralistic tone, Church himself would not rule out assassination as unacceptable
in all cases:
It is sometimes asked whether assassination should be ruled out absolutely, such
as in a time of truly grave national emergency. Adolf Hitler is often cited as an
example. Of course, the cases which the committee investigated were not of that
character ... So we are not talking about Adolf Hitler or anything of that
character, nor are we condemning actions taken in a grave national emergency
when the life of the republic is endangered. 36
The institutional legacy of the Congressional committees, on the other hand,
was an important one. Both houses established permanent select committees.
The committees include members who sit simultaneously on the Armed Services,
Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Appropriations committees. Because these
committees could now relinquish their oversight function without feeling entirely
cut out, the process was streamlined.37
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 is also attributable to the Congressional
committees.38 Under this act, the executive branch had to contend with statutory
^o a large extent the Church Committee's recommendations were
implemented by executive orders. See Ibid., 324.
36Congress, Senate 1975, xix.
37
Treverton, Covert Action, 247.
^he Oversight Act represents what the Senate Intelligence Committee was
able to salvage from S. 2525. See Dycus, Berney, Banks and Raven-Hansen, 324.
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reporting requirements on intelligence far more comprehensive than those of the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment.39 This act in conjunction with permanent
congressional oversight committees, sought to tame the "rogue elephant" without
imposing structure which might not be responsive to future crises. President
Ford's influence was not as subtle.
Ford, in a message to Congress on February 18, 1976, announced that he had
issued an executive order restricting the power of the intelligence agencies.
Ford's announcement, noted Crosby Noyes of the Washington Star, was "a
preemptive end-run on the Congress."40 With Executive Order 11905, the
executive branch moved to the offensive, taking the initiative of intelligence
reform away from Congress. It was an effort to prevent the dismantling of the
CIA.
Congress criticized the President for largely preserving the powers of the CIA.
The order did not prohibit covert operations. But Ford took one step that
Congress was unwilling to take. The thirty-six page executive order, which came
into force on March 1, 1976, contained a single sentence specifically prohibiting
assassination: "No employee of the U.S. Government shall engage in, or conspire
39
Johnson, 256.
40Noyes' speculation that the executive order was a preemptive actin is
compelling. But this prompts us to further speculate how Congress would have
reacted in the absence of the executive order and, specifically, in the absence of
the assassination ban. There is no evidence that Ford's actions influenced
Congress whatsoever. The assassination ban may have preempted nothing at all.
See Crosby S. Noyes, Washington Star ( 24 February 1976.
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to engage in, political assassination."41 Ford had imposed structure. Rather than
taming the "rogue elephant," as Congress had done, he diluted its power. He
went on to support legislation making assassination a crime. "Since it defines a
crime, legislation is necessary."42
C CONCLUSIONS
The extraordinary outburst of high sounding, moralistic rhetoric on Capitol
Hill, and President Ford's ban against assassination reflected the temper of the
day. Prior to Vietnam, the virtual absence of congressional interest in covert
operations served Congress's interests as much as it did the executive's.43
Oversight was not a politically salient activity. But Vietnam and Watergate
served to change this. "All the tensions and suspicions and hostilities that had
been building about the CIA since the Bay of Pigs, and had risen to a combustible
level during the Vietnam and Watergate years, now exploded," wrote Colby.44
It is significant, therefore, that the media heralded this "season of inquiry."
The instant fame of Woodward and Bernstein, the Washington Post reporters who
broke the Watergate story, whetted the media's appetite for scandal and intrigue
in the government. Political assassination made for particularly good press.
41Keesings Contemporary Archives, "President Ford's Proposals for Reform of
Intelligence Agencies," 27714.
42Gerald Ford in a message to Congress, 18 February 1976, in Ibid., 27713.
43Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 138.
"Colby and Forbath, 402.
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Vietnam and Watergate also spawned a new attitude of suspicion on Capitol
Hill. The media had led the voting public into an era of grass roots activism;
Congress, necessarily, followed. In 1974, a large number of newly elected
members won office on mandates of a new morality in government. The
allegations of CIA domestic abuses were raised only a month after this aggressive,
post-Watergate class had been elected. These new members were the most vocal
in demanding a full inquiry. As Colby noted:
It was clear the old power structure of the Congress could no longer control
their junior colleagues and hold off their curiosity about the secret world of
intelligence. In this new era, CIA was going to have to fend for itself without
that long-time special Congressional protection.45
Many of these "new era" members found an instant and highly visible pulpit for
their moral indignation in the Congressional investigation committees.
For Ford, it was politically risky to do anything other than join the chorus of
public and congressional outrage. In a meeting with Kissenger and Colby in
December 1974, Ford commented: "In the aftermath of Watergate, it was
important that we be totally aboveboard about these past abuses and avoid giving
any substance to charges that we were engaging in a cover-up."46 The
assassination ban contained in Executive Order 11905 was an important part of
45
Ibid., 403-404.
46Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Berkley Books, 1980), xxiii-xxiv.
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Ford's overall effort to politically distance the presidency from the past and from
the CIA, an agency which had lost its public standing.
The assassination ban reflected the temper of the 1970s. The American public
no longer perceived the Communist menace as the dominant threat. The greatest
threat was internal: a powerful, unchecked and abusive central government. The
"season of inquiry" was a sign of the times. But the times and the threats have
since changed. As a result, frictions have developed between the ideals contained
in the assassination ban and modern threats to the national security. Chapter
Four discusses these frictions and advances the arguments of those who advocate
rescinding the assassination ban as a means of eliminating them.
55
IV. POLITICAL ASSASSINATION AS POLITICAL UTILITY
Mark Twain cautions us:
We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it-
and stop there; lest we be like a cat that sits down on a hot stove lid. She will
never sit down on a hot stove lid again-and that is well; but also she will
never sit down on a cold one any more. 1
This chapter suggests that the assassination ban ignores Mark Twain's wisdom
by elevating the lessons of the Castro and Lumumba assassination attempts to a
doctrine of statecraft. Certainly these cases, which validate America's long
standing and healthy suspicion of power, represent hot stove lids. But how far
can policy go in generalizing and instituting the important lessons of these
episodes without denying American foreign policy important "cold lid" options?
The discussion presented here pursues this question in three parts. The first
section discusses the frictions which developed as a result of the assassination ban
and suggests possible explanations. The next section expands on Chapter Two
of this thesis by analyzing the warfighting advantages which assassination could
provide. The final section details deterrent effects which the United States may
have forfeited as a result of the declared prohibition.
'Mark Twain quoted in Paul Seabury, "Moral Purposes and Philosophical
Bases of American Foreign Policy," Orbis, Spring 1976, 10.
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This analysis directly challenges the efficacy and desirability of an explicit
assassination ban. It is, however, an incomplete analysis. Arguments presented
in this chapter are strictly utilitarian. They disregard the ideological costs of
pursuing national security objectives through seemingly draconian methods.
Without considering the ideological dimension of this complex reality, this
chapter can do no more than answer a lesser included question: how can
assassination serve the U.S. national interest?
A. FRICTIONS
Interpretation of the assassination ban had become increasingly factious as
early as the 1980s. Many of the fears and perceptions of the 1970s had become
irrelevant. Threats had evolved dramatically, and, as a result, frictions developed
between allegiance to ideals represented in the executive order and pursuit of
foreign policy vis-a-vis evolving threats to the national security.
Tensions between the ban and demands of realpolitik were not immediately
apparent. Despite his efforts to distance himself from his predecessor and CIA
abuses, Ford could not escape his party's recent past. Jimmy Carter, who made
intelligence reform a conspicuous part of his presidential campaign, defeated Ford
in 1976 with Water Mondale, a decidedly reform oriented member of the Church
Committee, as his Vice-President.
The Carter Administration proved to have no great appetite for covert
operations, thus postponing the inevitable clash between the assassination ban
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and executive power. 2 Tension increased, however, with a surge of covert
actions in the 1980s. Both Presidents Reagan and Bush reiterated the prohibition
against assassination in Executive Order 12333, first issued on December 4, 1981.
But the 1970s ban soon proved unacceptably restrictive for the presidential styles
of these men.
1. Reagan Tests the Executive Order
The assassination ban received its first test in 1986 when President Reagan
ordered the bombing raid on Libya. Thirteen F-lll fighter-bombers flying out of
England and twelve Navy A-6 attack planes launched from carriers in the
Mediterranean razed military and intelligence targets in and around Tripoli and
Benghazi.3 Additionally, four F-llls aimed sixteen, 2000 pound bombs at the
Bab al Azizia barracks, Qaddafi's living quarters. Thirty-seven civilians were
reported to have been killed or wounded in the raid.4 Qaddafi survived the
attack.
Despite administration insistence that the raid was not an attempt on
Qaddafi's life, many argue that there is reasonable evidence to the contrary.
William F. Buckley, Jr., for example, argues that if the raid was not, among other
things, an assassination attempt, "then a great many people went to unnecessary
2John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars (New York: William Morrow and
Company, Inc., 1986), 349.
3See George J. Church, "Going to the Source," Time, 28 April 1986, 17-26.
4This number includes an eighteen-month-old girl who was reportedly
Qaddafi's adopted daughter. Whether this claim is genuine or a propaganda ploy
remains uncertain.
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pains to try to establish exactly where Qaddafi would be sleeping on the night of
April 14, 1986."5 At a very minimum, the raid of 14 April meets the criteria for
an assassination advanced in Chapter One.
What remains unclear is the extent to which President Reagan was guided
by the executive order in selecting the mode of reprisal. Because of the response
chosen, even if the bombs had fallen differently, it is an extremely fine, legalistic
point whether Reagan was indeed in defiance of the executive order. How does
Executive Order 12333 interpret 2000 pound bombs delivered to the known
residence of a terrorist sponsor? Administration officials went to considerable
lengths to deny that the raid was in fact an execution attempt. "He was not a
direct target," explained Secretary of State George Shultz. "We have a general
stance that opposes direct efforts of that kind, and the spirit and intent was in
accord with those understandings."6 The implication is that because the attempt
was indirect, the order does not apply.
The frictions between the assassination ban and policy first surfaced
because the Reagan Administration chose to push the limits of the prohibition.
The reverse was the case under Bush, as the assassination ban became a specific
limiter to actions during the first year of his administration.
5William F. Buckley, Jr., "Mr. Webster Has it Exactly Wrong," National Review,
24 November 1989, 63.
6George Shultz quoted from a 17 April 1986 press conference in "U.S. Exercises
Right of Self Defense Against Libyan Terrorism," Department of State Bulletin,
June 1986, 15.
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2. The Bush Administration Under the Ban
In 1989, President Bush cited the assassination ban as an unreasonable
restraint during the bungled attempt on October 3 to oust Panamanian dictator
General Manuel Noriega. Criticized by members of the Senate Intelligence
Committee for not moving quickly enough to support the coup plotters, Bush
contended that U.S. military officers and intelligence agents on the scene had
refrained from cooperating too closely with the plotters on the grounds that
Noriega might be killed.7
This was a reasonable concern based on our criteria. Had Noriega been
killed in a U.S. supported coup, then critics of the action would have surely
evoked the assassination ban. Although an executive order contains no punitive
element, the political costs could have been substantial. Unlike Reagan, Bush,
who had just recently assumed office, was unwilling to take this political risk.
It is likely that the assassination ban was once again discussed at the
highest levels, if not presidential levels, during the Gulf War. Based on
unclassified sources, it is difficult to be certain to what degree Saddam Hussein
was targeted before, during, or since the war. What is clear is that strong popular
support persists in the United States for pursuing Saddam's downfall or demise.8
7Towell, 2812.
8
In polls conducted in February 1991, close to fifty percent of Americans said
that the war should not end until Saddam is removed from power. See Stephen
Budiansky, "The Real Target?" U.S. News and World Report 18 February 1991,
20.
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Perhaps not since Adolf Hitler has there been a national leader whose
assassination would have been more enthusiastically embraced by the American
public. President Bush himself made it clear that the problem was not with the
Iraqi people, but rather with their leadership. Some public figures wondered
aloud why the U.S. did not target Saddam. Air Force Chief of Staff General
Michael Dugan, for instance, told several reporters that, in the event of war, the
United States would attempt not only to target Saddam, but his family and
mistress as well.9
Within the Bush Administration, by contrast, any official discussion on the
matter was suppressed. Indeed, it was publicly denounced. Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney fired Dugan for his indiscreet remarks. The United States,
announced General Norman Schwartzkopf, does not have "a policy of trying to
kill any particular individual." 10
Nevertheless, some unclassified evidence exists that efforts to target
Saddam himself may have gone beyond the so-called "silver bullet" option, in
which Saddam would be killed by a lucky shot, simply because he was in the
wrong place at the wrong time. On the first night of the war, U.S. military
planners knew of a dozen places where Saddam slept and worked. All were
bombed. 11 According to a book compiled by U.S. News and World Report
'Neil Livingstone, "Assassination: Could We Have Hit Saddam?" Soldier of
Fortune, September 1991, 41.
10Norman Schwartzkopf quoted in Ibid.
uBudiansky, 26.
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magazine, Triumph Without Victory: the Unreported History of the Persian Gulf
War, contends that the U.S. also tried to kill Saddam in the final hours of the
war.
12 According to the book, two, 5000-pound blockbuster bombs failed to
catch the Iraqi leader in the bunker that U.S. intelligence thought he was in.
What conclusions should be drawn from these frictions? Simply because
a convention is not in robust condition is no cause to conclude that it is
moribund. Various conventions governing the conduct of war have historically
helped deter, prevent, or terminate conflicts. On this basis alone war conventions
deserve guarding against shortsighted pragmatism. But America's lack of
commitment to this convention should at least prompt further analysis. Either
some aspects of the contemporary situation have changed since the adoption of
the assassination ban, or the prohibition was flawed from the outset, an
expression of national ideal which could never have been met in practice.
3. Reconsidering Clausewitz
The intellectual foundations of the assassination ban originate in a
Clausewitzian world view. In Vom Kriege, Clausewitz describes war as a
composite of three elements: governments, armies, and the people. Governments
represent the political elements of war and alone hold the power to wage or
terminate war. Armies are organizations that serve the government as the
instruments for making war. The third vital element in any war consists of the
•
12Stewart M. Powell, "U.S. Botched Bid to Kill Hussein, Book Says," San
Francisco Examiner, 12 June 1992, A6.
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people, whom, according to Clausewitz, should be excluded from war as far as
possible. Assassination, since it targets governments or the people rather than
armies,13 is not a logical use of force in Clausewitz's trinitarian universe.
The logic of this world-picture is flawed vis-a-vis the Third World and
emerging sub-national entities. As Martin van Creveld suggests: "the
Clausewitzian Universe is rapidly becoming out of date and can no longer
provide us with a proper framework for understanding war."14 In modern
armed violence, distinctions between governments, armies, and the peoples are
often less clear. This is manifest in two trends. First, the state has lost its de
facto monopoly on organized violence. Sub-national groups, terrorists and
insurgents being two examples, are in the ascendant.
The second trend indicating the irrelevance of the Clausewitzian trinity is
that leaders and war making organizations, particularly in the Third World, have
become indistinguishable. 15 The demise of feudalism and the incipient rise of
the modern bureaucratic state led to a situation where most rulers had ceased to
exercise direct command over their armies. Wars could be waged through
surrogates, ministers of war who were servants of the state, devoted to their ruler
yet divorced from his personal agendas. Over time, a code of behavior developed
13Military officers of General or Flag rank hold a unique position in this
spectrum. While they certainly belong to the armed forces, they also serve a
political function.





which forbade direct assaults against those responsible for the conduct of war
from the top.
The twentieth century has seen gradual obsolescence of these conventions.
Third World war making organizations are increasingly constructed along
personal and charismatic lines. The distinctions between leaders and the political
entities they lead have disappeared or blurred. A tendency has emerged,
therefore, to regard such leaders as criminals, "subject to attack, or the threat of
attack, as a means of bringing pressure to bear."16
Another effect of the convergence of leaders and their war making
organizations is that the goals pursued by these organization have also
changed.17 Wartime objectives have assumed a more personal quality. Goals
emphasize the interests of the leaders rather than those of the state or
organization itself.
In summary, frictions have developed between the assassination ban and
national security goals in the United States because the conventions which
regarded attempts to assassinate leaders to be beyond the scope of war fail to
consider these new realities. In many instances, the world no longer conforms to
the Clausewitzian trinity. Instead, the elements of the trinity are often
inextricably merged, rendering the option of attacking one element, without






B. ASSASSINATION AND WARFIGHTING
"Unless the societies in question are willing to adjust both thought and action
to the rapidly changing new realities," writes van Creveld, "they are likely to
reach the point where they will no longer be capable of employing organized
violence at all. Once this situation comes about, their continued survival as
cohesive political entities will also be put in doubt."18 If, as van Creveld
suggests, it becomes impossible to conduct a war against an organization without
waging war against the leader of the organization, then the assassination ban will
become dysfunctional. This section explores the argument that assassination,
legitimized as an instrument of national policy, may emerge as a warfighting
alternative which is too valuable to surrender through a clear declaratory policy.
1. Warfighting at the National Level
Even as familiar forms of armed conflict are sinking into obscurity, violence
continues unabated in the Third World. 19 Because weapons proliferation has
elevated these nations beyond the level of military insignificance, Third World
conflict today threatens security beyond the Third World states. Economically,
the exploding growth of the newly industrialized countries of the Third World
18
Ibid., ix.
19Despite the vast differences among the states considered as belonging to the
Third World, there are also fundamental similarities that justify, for the sake of
parsimony, considering them together. These generalizations about the Third
World are not intended to suggest that all Third World countries share these
characteristics equally. Different states manifest different strengths and
weaknesses.
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make them important players in determining the shape and direction of the global
economy.20 Oil reserves of the Persian Gulf make that region increasingly vital
to the international market. Furthermore, Third World cooperation has become
imperative in resolving issues related to the environment, overpopulation, and
narcotics trafficking.
Far from being marginal actors, the Third World occupies a central role in
matters of international security. Yet the West has demonstrated a profound
inability to understand the dynamics of warfare in the Third World. An
unimpressive record of military failures includes episodes from the world's most
important armed forces. The British lost India, Palestine, Kenya, Cyprus and
Aden. The French spent six years fighting only to fail in Indochina and another
seven before losing Algeria. The Belgians were forced to surrender the Congo,
the Dutch lost Indonesia, and the Portuguese fought for years before they were
forced to capitulate in Angola and Mozambique. For nine years America, the
world's technological leader at the time, fought fruitlessly in Vietnam. The Soviet
Union learned an equally painful lesson in Afghanistan.
A record like this should cause politicians, military leaders, and academia
to reevaluate the fundamentals of war in our time. Yet, "by and large no such
attempt at reevaluation was made," writes van Creveld. "Held captive by the
accepted strategic framework, time and time again the losers explained away their
20Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, June
1991, 254.
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defeat by citing mitigating factors."21 This is no longer acceptable. The nature
of the entities which wage war, the conventions by which war is surrounded, and
the ends for which war is fought must be rethought and restructured.
The origins of these failures, claim some realists, spring from moralism in
foreign policy. They argue that the idea of international morality is illusory.
George Kennan writes, "there are no internationally accepted standards of
morality to which the U.S. Government could appeal if it wished to act in the
name of moral principles."22 Kennan also suggests that "the most serious fault
of our past policy formulation lies in something that I might call the legalistic-
moralistic approach to international problems . . . the belief that it should be
possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the
international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and
restraints."23 Hans Morgenthau contends that relations between states are "not
controlled by universal moral principles concrete enough to guide political actions
of individual nations." Thus the attempt to apply moral principles beyond the
bounds of one's own state is itself a form of "immorality."24 A realist would
argue that forfeiting assassination as a warfighting option because of an ideal
21Van Creveld, 222.
^George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreien Affairs, Winter
1985-86, 207.
^George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951), 65-66.
24Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Knopf,
1951), 35-36.
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associated with the mission of American democracy is fundamentally flawed.
Indeed, it is misinformed hubris.
The cardinal problem of warfighting strategy for the realist is determining
where the enemy is most vulnerable. The majority of Third world states are
governed by some form of authoritarian rule. An organization under
authoritarian rule will tend to be efficient and streamlined. However, an
organization that has achieved efficiency by strict central control will probably be
inflexible, and, therefore, vulnerable.25
The necessity to capitalize on every vulnerability is more pronounced in
this genre of conflict. When a powerful state engages a weak one in combat, the
stronger force will tend to face certain political disadvantages. A weak power can
commit the most heinous atrocities in the name of survival without significantly
compromising its political support or its moral integrity. Conversely, a powerful
state will be criticized for cruelty simply for engaging the weaker enemy
effectively. Where no symmetry exists the stronger power faces a no win
situation. His best alternative, therefore, is to achieve a quick victory. "For him,"
writes van Creveld, "the only road to salvation is to win quickly in order to
escape the worst consequences of his cruelty: swift, ruthless brutality may well
prove to be more merciful than prolonged restraint. A terrible end is better than





But taking advantage of an authoritarian government's vulnerability to
leadership targeting can be problematic. There is little agreement concerning the
social, political and psychological impact of assassination on a target country.
There is an insufficient data base to predict the insidious side effects which may
accompany such an operation. It may be possible, however, to mitigate this
uncertainty by considering a more general data base. With few exceptions,
authoritarian regimes do not have formal mechanisms for regular turnover of
their top leadership. Consequently, authoritarian rulers often die in office. This
offers a data set from which to draw some general conclusions.
Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington studied the effects on the stability
of states whose authoritarian rulers have died in office.27 Their analysis includes
all instances where long-duration leaders (ten years or more) of authoritarian
states died in office from natural or accidental causes between World War II and
1984.28
Although Betts and Huntington do not conclude that instability necessarily
follows the death of an authoritarian leader, they do cite this as the most common
result. Furthermore, they identify three factors which could help predict the
types, extent and timing of instability. The first factor is pre-death instability. A
high level of pre-death instability indicates that instability will continue unabated
^See Richard K. Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, "Dead Dictators and Rioting
Mobs," International Security, Winter 1986-86, 112-144.
28This data includes four cases in which the leader was assassinated in office.
The authors drew no specific conclusions about these cases, however.
69
or increase following the death. The second element is duration in power.
Prolonged duration of the leader in power indicates political rigidity and is likely
to lead to intense political demands after the death. The final factor cited in this
study is the level of social organization. A high level of autonomous social
organization facilitates the mobilization of people for post-death protests, rioting,
and insurrection.
The death of an authoritarian leader, therefore, appears to be a vehicle for
introducing instability into a country. Is this ever in the U.S. national interest?
Perhaps. Betts and Huntington point out that in some cases instability led to new
leadership with significantly different policies. In many of these instances, more
moderate policies resulted. In three cases (Dominican Republic, Portugal, Spain),
instability led to the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones.
The authors found no cases where death of a long-term authoritarian leader
produced results markedly unfavorable to U.S. interest.
The loss of a military leader may similarly provide a break in continuity
which may introduce temporary instability into an army. This is a question
which need not be restricted to the Third World. The Yamamoto assassination
raises important questions about targeting military leaders.
Determining the degree to which the loss of a top army or naval
commander will affect, or might have affected, the outcome of a battle or a war
is speculative. Historians often engage in these types of "what ifs." Lee's plans,
for example, never seemed to work as well after Stonewall Jackson was
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accidentally killed by his own men after the Battle of Chancellorsville. 29 How
important was this event to the outcome of the war?
Officers in battle, if they are identifiable, have always been especially
vulnerable. Momentary lack of direction resulting from an officer killed in action
may change the character of a battle or a fire fight. In the 1700s and 1800s, for
example, sharpshooters routinely took aim at enemy officers on the opposite
decks as ships closed in for final broadsides.30 A carefully aimed shot took the
life of Admiral Horatio Nelson at Trafalgar in 1805. Since ground officers are
usually in proximity of the radio, antennas have more recently become good
targets for grenadiers.
But the Yamamoto mission was different. The United States targeted
Yamamoto not just because he was an enemy officer, but because he was
Yamamoto. His death was not incidental to the mission, but its sole purpose.
This sort of military leadership targeting does not enjoy the same long tradition.
Indeed, opportunities not taken are more common. The Duke of Wellington at
Waterloo specifically chose not to fire upon Napoleon when the opportunity
arose. One historian writes:
Across the field stood Napoleon Bonaparte with his staff. An alert English
artilleryman called out to the Duke: "There's Bonaparte, Sir; I think I can reach






gunner: "No, no, Generals commanding armies have something else to do than
shoot at one another."31
But the idea of "total war" had not yet developed at the time of
Wellington's sporting decision. Perhaps it was William Tecumseh Sherman who
heralded the death knell of Wellington's era when, in reply to General Hood's
protests to the evacuation and burning of Atlanta, he announced:
You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty and you
cannot refine it.32
The advent of total war changed the nature of war and the attitudes of the
military and civilian war planners. Since the 1940s, any action which contributes
to victory has been considered legitimate and moral. Witness Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.33
In conjunction with the development of the concept of total war, the
increasingly centralized nature of war changed the view of targeting enemy
commanders. These changes prompted British military theorist J.F.C. Fuller to
suggest that the object of war was no longer to kill off a foe's privates one by one,
31Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword (New York:
Harper and Row, 1969), 472.
32William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of William T. Sherman vol. 2 (New




but to surprise the enemy generals at the breakfast table.34 Headquarters and
leaders are increasingly important targets in military operations.
Although the assassination ban has not affected the perceived legitimacy
of targeting command and control centers, specifically targeting a military leader
like Yamamoto has become controversial. It is unlikely that the Yamamoto case
occurred to the drafters of the assassination ban. Indeed, it is possible that they
were unaware of the Yamamoto example altogether. The communications
intelligence that identified Yamamoto's flight in 1943 was not made public
knowledge until 1978, two years after the adoption of the executive order.35 The
forfeiture of this capability was most likely incidental,inadvertent, and, perhaps,
inadvisable.
2. Warfighting at the Sub-National Level
There is little historical data upon which to draw conclusions regarding the
effectiveness of assassination as a weapon in a regional or global conflict. There
is, however, significant evidence that suggests that selective targeting of
individuals within the context of conflict at a sub-national level can be highly
effective. This section considers the application of assassination in
counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist efforts.
History suggests that anti-infrastructure operations are an indispensable





1954, failed to recognize this and lost. Although the French supported a nominal
pacification program, they relied primarily on conventional warfighting solutions.
It was not until the loss of Vietnam was inevitable that the French acknowledged
the importance of dismantling the enemy infrastructure. General Henri Navarre,
commander of the French forces in Vietnam at the time of their defeat at Dien
Bien Phu, wrote that "against an enemy who can succeed only with the support
of the population the basic problem is to keep the latter on our side by watching
over it, by reassuring it, and by protecting it."36 Navarre's prescription included
elimination the Viet Minn infrastructure.
During the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the British recognized from
the outset that victory depended on destroying the enemy's infrastructure. In
April 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations in
Malaya, set forth four objectives aimed at separating the guerrillas from the
villages: secure all populated areas, break up the communist infrastructure in the
populated areas, deny the communists food and support from the populated
areas, and seek to destroy the enemy by forcing him to fight on terms of the
government's choosing. By 1957, the guerrillas were clearly on the defensive. On
31 July 1960, the emergency was formally ended.
Clearly, the lesson of the French and British examples is that the enemy
infrastructure is central to the success or failure of any insurgency. Nathan Leites
36Henri Navarre quoted in Chester Cooper, The American Experience with
Pacification in Vietnam (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis,
International and Social Studies Division, 1972), 100.
74
and Charles Wolf, Jr. advance a systemic model of rebellion which illustrates why
this is so.
37 Figure 1 diagrams this model. An insurgency requires inputs of
recruits, information, shelter, food, financing and materials. An insurgency
acquires these inputs from either the local environment (endogeny), or from
external sources (exogeny). Once acquired, the insurgent group converts the
inputs into outputs through their logistics, intelligence, communications, and
operations functions. The outputs of the insurgency include acts of sabotage,
violence against individuals, public demonstrations, small-scale attacks, and
eventually the use of conventional forces and tactics. The insurgency's outputs
also include the exercise of administrative and governmental jurisdiction.
The ultimate focus of the systemic view is to identify methods of
counterinsurgency. Two are readily apparent. First, a counterinsurgency effort
can destroy the insurgency's outputs. This is the traditional counterforce role of
military action. During the Vietnam War, the United States dedicated most of its
attention and assets to this side of the equation. The second method of
counterinsurgency which suggests itself in the model is to deny inputs to the
enemy. The exogenous source of inputs for the Viet Cong was North Vietnamese
support. The United States pursued exogenous input denial through air, ground
and naval interdiction. The principle endogenous source of inputs was the
37Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic
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Figure 1. Insurgency as a System
Reprinted from Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An
Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
1970), 35.
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population of South Vietnam. Endogenous input denial can be accomplished only
by severing the connection between the insurgency and the population. The VCI
was that connection.
The weakness of the United States counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam lay
in its priorities. Countering guerrillas in the field maintained primacy over
eliminating the VCI throughout the war. War planners were slow to understand
the need to address the political problems in South Vietnam's countryside. Body
counts were meaningless as long as the communists maintained their grip on the
population. The infrastructure gave the enemy his staying power, his ability to
regenerate his strength. As long as the enemy held the population in the
countryside, he could replace guerrillas. If the United States had broken the link
between the population and the insurgency, however, attrition of guerrillas would
have become meaningful.
After eight years of fighting in Vietnam, the United States finally realized
that the political infrastructure could not be ignored. Yet, ironically, after years
of cataloging the many lessons of Vietnam, this is one mistake which the United
States may be predisposed to repeat. The assassination ban, as currently written,
is a major obstacle to an effective anti-infrastructure campaign. It may similarly
prove to be an obstacle to countering another sub-national threat: terrorism.
When contemplating the employment of force against terrorism,
governments must exercise caution. Inciting government overreaction is generally
part of the terrorist's agenda. According to William Farrell:
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Of the many purposes for which terrorists conduct their activity, there are two
which either attempt to have a government overreact or, by not reacting, show
inherent weakness. Those who decide to make use of soldiers in lieu of police
must heavily weigh these factors. Are they doing what is needed, or what the
terrorists want?38
Striking out indiscriminately against terrorism, therefore, defies all
rationale. Precision is imperative when combating terrorism. Fadlo Massabni,
who was the American defense attache in Beirut in 1983, relates a story which
may be instructive in this regard.39 After a lunch at the apartment of a leading
shiite cleric, Massabni and his host adjourned to the seventh floor balcony and
looked out over the slums and refugee camps of south Beirut. The cleric
commented, "If I were to take 100 men and tell them to jump from this balcony,
all 100 would jump." Massabni asked, "Would you jump?" When the cleric failed
to answer, Massabni suggested, "Too many people in Lebanon are willing to have
other people make sacrifices." Massabni later conjectured that he had discovered
the key to combating terrorism. "We should not be trying to kill the kids but the
people who don't want to die."
Countering terrorism through assassination has been a long and successful
tradition in Israel. In 1972, MOSSAD agents assassinated Cassan Kanafani, the
reputed planner of the May 1972 Lod Airport Massacre, by planting a radio
38William Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism (Boulder: West
View Press, 1982), 122.
39Fadlo Massabni quoted in David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid
Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper
and Row, 1988), 365.
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triggered bomb in his car. Also in 1972, Mahmoud Hamshani, the PLO and Al
Fatah representative in Paris, was killed by a small explosive device planted in
his telephone receiver by MOSSAD operatives. In 1979, a car packed with one
hundred pounds of explosives was detonated in the proximity of Abu Hassan, the
reputed mastermind of the 1972 Black September Munich Olympics Massacre.40
A 1988 Israeli commando raid dispensed with Khalil al-Wazir, known worldwide
by his nom de querre Abu Jihad.41 Most recently, on 16 February 1992, U.S.
manufactured Apache helicopters of the Israeli Air Force located, engaged and
destroyed Sheik Abbas Musawi, head of the Iranian-supported terrorist group
Hezbollah.42
Assassination as a counter-terrorist measure can be more than a retaliatory
tactic. Assassinating terrorist leaders is a proactive weapon which could disrupt
terrorist groups and thereby preclude future operations. Terrorist organizations
are characteristically reliant on a single, charismatic leader who cannot easily be
replaced. They are structured in a centric pattern-the power is concentrated in
a single center. 43 The death of that leader may precipitate disarray and a
40Bruce Hoffman, Commando Raids: 1946-1983 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1985), 36-37.
4t
Jill Smolowe, "Assignment: Murder," Time, 2 May 1988, 36-37.
42Seth Cropsey, "Learning from the Death of a Sheik," Washington Times, 8
March 1992, B4.
^Steven Sloan, Beating International Terrorism (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:
Air University Press, 1986), 31.
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struggle for power within the group. Even if the transfer of power is smooth, the
successor, although equally malicious, may not be equally adroit.44
Furthermore, if the assassin is unidentified, some may suspect a plot from
within. Distrust, mutual suspicion, and splintering within the group may ensue.
Tightening of security will further complicate the already difficult communication
system. All this will reduce the group's capabilities, at least temporarily, and
may set fissures in the organizational structure which may eventually cause its
collapse.45
The development of doctrine on terrorism in general, and an offensive
doctrine of counter-terrorism or terrorism preemption in particular, has been
stifled by the continuing lack of agreement on whether terrorism is an act of war
or a criminal act. This question fundamentally impacts the issue of legality and
carries significant operational implications. This qualification has been a
hinderance to the development of preemptive doctrine.
If terrorism is a crime, then due process must prevail. Rules of evidence
and the rights of the accused will dictate counter-terrorist methods. Perpetrators
must be apprehended and brought to trial. This presents a number of problems.
First, gathering detailed evidence necessary to prevail in a courtroom is, for all
intents and purposes, impossible in a non-permissive environment. Traditional





second problem is that apprehending terrorists in an uncooperative or perhaps
belligerent country is exceedingly difficult. These considerations become
exponentially more difficult in cases of state sponsored terrorism. It is simply not
realistic to think that the United States can routinely bring terrorists abroad to
justice.46 On the other hand, if terrorism is war, these concerns are mitigated.
The "accused" becomes the "enemy," and a "smoking gun" will suffice for
evidence. Preemptive measures became viable alternatives along with preventive
and reactive measures.
But viewing terrorism as war also poses problems. "If we strike too
broadly," writes Stansfield Turner, "We kill innocents, and are just like the
terrorists; if we aim too narrowly, we appear to be targeting a person, and
violate our policy against assassination."47 Terrorist groups rarely offer targets
of sufficient value for conventional military attack. A terrorist organization's only
strategic asset is the terrorist himself.48 Attrition, therefore, is a necessary
alternative in a "war against terrorism." Attriting terrorists, however, will
inevitably resemble assassination.
46Brian Jenkins, Terrorism: Policy Issues for the Bush Administration (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), 7.





Brian Jenkins contends that if the United States responds to terrorism with
assassination, it will be guilty of employing terrorist tactics.49 This point is
arguable. Terrorist actions are best characterized by their targets, not their tactics.
Randomness is the defining feature of terrorist activity. Its method is
indiscriminate murder of innocent people. Assassination, conversely, is
completely discriminate and strikes directly at the source.
To summarize, this section has examined the warfighting advantages which
political assassination may provide. At the national level, we see that many Third
World nations, which have prematurely emerged from their military infancies
through weapons proliferation, may be particularly vulnerable to leadership
targeting. Also at the national level, it appears that military leadership targeting,
exemplified in the Yamamoto case, may, at the very least, provide a temporary
tactical advantage. At the sub-national level, counter-terrorist and
counterinsurgency efforts may hinge on specific targeting of individuals. This
discussion has suggested that assassination, as a tactic that goes directly to the
source, perhaps precluding a greater evil while sparing the lives of those which
are necessarily lost in a more conventional response, may be a just instrument of
warfare indeed. The next section of this chapter focusses on deterrence, the final
and most compelling argument against the assassination ban.
'Jenkins, Assassination, 7.
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C DETERRENT ADVANTAGES SURRENDERED
The primary objective of U.S. military strategy is to deter attacks against
American interests. The previous section discussed assassination in the context
of failed deterrence, and suggested that its prohibition deprives the United States
of a tactic which strikes at the primary vulnerabilities of authoritarian
governments, insurgencies, and terrorist organizations. This section argues that
deterrent advantages have also been lost. This argument proceeds by discussing
the special problems of deterring Third World states and sub-national groups and
then by suggesting that the threat of assassination, or ambiguity in this regard,
may help serve these deterrent purposes.
1. What Deters?
Balance of power is the most widely used theory in international relations
to describe national behavior. Balance of power theory argues that the behavior
of states is driven by external threats. States align to protect themselves against
the power of or threats from other states in a manner which prevents any other
state or group of states from achieving preponderance. If the balance of power
is unfavorable, a state will be deterred from aggression.
What deters a Third World state is not well understood. Balance of power
theory has been particularly inadequate in providing an explanation. 50 The
reason for this is that while Third World leaders do indeed make rational
calculations to resist the threats they face, they must contend with a broader
50David, 233.
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spectrum of threats. Specifically, a Third World leader must consider not only
threats from beyond his borders, but internal threats as well. Steven David
designates this "omnibalancing."
Omnibalancing relies on the following assumption: the most powerful
determinant of the behavior of Third World leaders is a rational calculation of
how to ensure their political and physical survival.51 Instead of pursuing policy
which will benefit the state, a Third World leader will make policy decisions
based on how a policy will affect his probability of remaining in power. If this
assumption is accepted, then it becomes fathomable why they will sometimes
protect themselves at the expense of the interests of the state. This includes
seemingly irrational aggressiveness vis-a-vis a superpower. Seth Cropsey writes,
"What those men do grasp clearly is dissuasion: easily understood
demonstrations of power that threaten them personally."52
David offers three reasons why Third World leaders are most influenced
by threats to their hold on power.53 The first is the artificiality of the Third
World state. The great majority of these states had been colonies out of which
colonial powers created a state. The boundaries of these states were created
arbitrarily to replace less formal demarcations. As a result, individuals within the






national consciousness. Secondly, legitimacy is likely to be weaker for Third
World leaders. Many Third World regimes come to power through force, and
must, therefore, use force to remain in power. Because they lack legitimacy, they
face continual threats to their rule. Finally, Third World leaders are especially
aggressive about their hold on power because loss of power often means loss of
life.
Because of the relationship between the Third World leader, the state he
rules, and the rest of the world, it becomes evident that it is the leadership of the
state, and not the state itself, that is the proper unit of analysis for understanding
Third World foreign policy. 54 When a leadership is confronted with a choice of
endangering its hold on power or endangering the state itself, it will inevitably
choose the latter. It seems illogical, therefore, to expect a Third World state to
yield to a deterrent which threatens the well being of the state without also
clearly threatening the regime.
2. Can Assassination Deter?
There are numerous examples of organizations that have moderated their
extremism to avoid a threat to their leadership. It has been alleged that the Israeli
government adopted a no-prisoner policy against terrorists. Following the
apparent implementation of this policy, terrorist activity on Israeli territory
declined noticeably. 55 Similarly, Israel's harsh and swift raids against airplane
"Ibid., 243.
D5Van Geel and Newman, 443.
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hijackers virtually eliminated hijacking threats to El Al passengers for more than
a decade. 56
Many advocates of assassination butress their argument by pointing to
Libya. Although the U.S. bombing attack on Tripoli was not officially (or,
perhaps, unofficially) an assassination attempt, it is worthy of consideration. That
attack represented a direct threat not only to the Libyan regime, but also to the
life of Colonel Qaddafi. Although determining cause and effect is problematic
in this case, there has been a significant diminution in Libyan-sponsored terrorist
incidents.57 The attack seems to have served its purpose by changing Qaddafi'
s
perceptions of American intentions. It created uncertainty regarding American
policy toward the assassination of foreign leaders.
The United States need not engage in assassination in order to deter.
Rescinding the assassination ban, therefore, is not tantamount to inaugurating a
reign of terror. Indeed, rescinding the assassination ban and conducting
assassination is as far apart as nuclear deterrence and mass murder. Deterrence
requires only a credible threat to introduce ambiguity-a threat which need never
be uttered. A blanket declaration against assassination, however, makes the U.S.
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The first reaction [of most men] to the proposition that assassination may, in
certain cases, be justifiable and useful is revulsion and rejection. This does more
credit to his heart than to his head."58
In brutal reality, political assassination could provide decision makers with a
comparatively humane warfighting alternative. Assassination may save lives. "If
blood is the measure," writes Brian Jenkins, "assassination is surely the cleanest
form of warfare."59 Thirty-seven people died when the U.S. bombed Libya.
Could the assassination of one man have served the purpose of the raid? Indeed,
might it not have been the best response? Perhaps directing military might
directly at the responsible individuals enhances the legitimacy of the sender by
demonstrating not only resolve, but also precision.
Furthermore, the national interest could be served even without spilling
blood. If the declared prohibition were eliminated, then the threat of
assassination, or ambiguity of American intent regarding assassination, could
serve as a credible deterrent. Indeed, a threat against the leadership itself, direct
or indirect, clear or ambiguous, may be the only way to deter some Third World





Assassination can provide an active defense, serve as a credible deterrent, and
spare the lives of noncombatants necessarily lost in a conventional response.
Equally important, however, are ideas absent from this chapter. The
responsibility of a democratic society to protect its people has frequently
necessitated the use of deadly force. But the maintenance of American-democratic
values is an equally dominant imperative. Despite objections from the realists,
the American society and state does have a special character: a mission
structured by a framework of value oriented goals.60 That mission, to serve and
promote the interests of justice and individual freedom, appears to be




V. ASSASSINATION, REALPOLITIK AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL
Two contradictory impulses, realism and idealism, have cast long opposing
shadows on the field of American foreign policy. When it is dawn for the realists,
it is dusk for the idealists. Pendular oscillations between the influences of
national interest and power on the one hand, and ideals and normative values on
the other—between Realpolitik and idealism, interest and moral principle,
Washington and Wilsons-have long governed the Janus-faced pattern of
American involvement in the world. This dualism cuts to the essence of the
deadly dilemma of assassination in American foreign policy.
Realists contend that states behave strictly by pursuing self-interest, without
regard for morality or normative values. The realist model portrays an image of
states as billiard balls. Governments judge, by experience and intuition, the
requisite amount of force necessary to move one or another ball in a preferred
direction.2 Since all's fair, ends justify means and might makes right, realism
Samuel P. Huntington, The Dilemma of American Ideals and Institutions in
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1981), 3.
2Robert L. Rothstein, "On the Costs of Realism," Political Science Quarterly,
September 1972, 441.
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elegantly absolves statesmen from individual moral responsibility in the pursuit
of the national interest.3
No period of American history has been without both of these influences
acting concurrently, establishing the dialectical process which shapes all U.S.
policy.4 Nevertheless, some periods are characterized by the domination of one
force over the other. The Federalist years, for example, witnessed the
preeminence of political realism. When realism returned in the 1930s as the
dominate influence in American political thought, the movement was commonly
designated as "neorealism." The writings of Nicholas Spykman, Reinhold
Niebuhr, and E. H. Carr embodied neorealist thought prior to World War II. 5
Under the patronage of such men as George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau and
Walter Lippmann, among many others, neorealism emerged in full flower in the
years immediately after the war and dominated throughout the 1950s and much
of the 1960s.6 Today realism is once again enjoying something of a vogue.
Idealism, too, has enjoyed periods when its influences were more strongly
reflected in American politics. The Calvinist conception of America as the
3Linda B. Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy: A Failed Consensus?" Daedalus,
Summer 1980, 143.
4For an excellent discussion of this process, see Robert Osgood, Ideals and
Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1953).
5See Osgood.
6See Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986).
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redeemer nation was most clearly articulated in the eighteenth century in
Jonathan Edwards' Freedom of the Will .7 John Calhoun's writings exemplified
the Calvinist tradition in the nineteenth century.8 Idealism also characterized the
first four decades of the twentieth century, becoming an apotheosis in Woodrow
Wilson's vision of America as "the only idealistic nation in the world," endowed
with "the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world."9 In the
1970s, the experiences of Vietnam and Watergate, politically manifest in the
election of Jimmy Carter, inaugurated a "new moralism" to challenge the
neorealism of the 1950s and 1960s. 10
The idealist element which distinguishes U.S. foreign policy has evoked
admiration from some of the world's governments, contempt from others, and
more than occasional bewilderment from all. But the force of America's
philosophic purpose in foreign affairs is undeniable. Realists must concede the
importance that idealism has played in shaping the course of American
development. "The unifying principle" of history for nineteenth-century historian
George Bancroft, as Samuel Huntington points out, "was progress ordained and
7See Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. I
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1954).
8See Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who
Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1948).
Woodrow Wilson quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the
American Character," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983, 4.
10See Theodore Harold White, America in Search of Itself: The Making of the
President (New York: Harper and Row, 1982).
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planned by God—the advance of liberty, justice, and humanity, all of which were
peculiarly exemplified in American history, where providential guidance had
brought together a singularly fit people and fit institutions." 11
If Bancroft is correct that the pursuit of these ideals have united America, then
is loss of unity not the logical result when these ideals are frustrated by the near
term pragmatism of the realists? Realist arguments are too often coopted to
provide an esoteric platform for pursuing rather common foreign policy. 12 At
some point the denigration of moral principle in the conduct of foreign affairs
"will rob U.S. and Western policies of purpose, direction and ultimate
strength." 13 The inextricable association between democratic ideals and
American foreign policy, which this paper has to this point neglected, is critical
to our discussion of political assassination.
As its numerous disclaimers indicate, Chapter Four presented only the realist
argument. This chapter advances the idealist's claim that a nation cannot
embrace liberal democratic tradition while pursuing foreign policy through the
sights of a sniper rifle. But the case against political assassination is not strictly
1George Bancroft quoted in Huntington, 1.
12Hegel, for example argues that moral criticism of state affairs is impossible
since the state determines the standard of things. This articulation of "might is
right" in the pursuit of national interest was license for Prussian imperialism. See
Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies Vol. 2, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962).
'
13Eugen Loebl, "Moral Values and U.S. Policy: An End to the Age of
Hypocrisy?" Strategic Review, Spring 1986, 28.
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moralistic. The pragmatic argument opposing assassination is also compelling.
This chapter attacks assassination from both positions.
A. PRACTICAL UNCERTAINTIES
U.S. efforts to dispose of Castro in the early 1960s are indicative of one
variable which is often overlooked in a discussion of political assassination: its
operational difficulty. In the months before Desert Storm, as war with Iraq
seemed inevitable, many nervous Americans wondered, "why don't we just kill
Saddam?" The word "just" indicates the naivete of this petition. Assassination,
contrary to its reputation as the simple solution, is an enormously complex
undertaking. This section discusses the operational, institutional, and
philosophical concerns which profoundly complicate an effort to specifically target
an individual.
1. Operational Challenges
Modern warfare (since Napoleon) has exhibited the tendency for
assassination to be rare while hostilities are in progress. 14 This may appear
counterintuitive since war enhances the justification for assassination. The
destruction of an enemy commander or high civilian official in times of war may
be seen as an act of patriotism committed in the defense of one's home and fellow
citizens. But this phenomenon is not as paradoxical as it may seem. The
outbreak of war is necessarily accompanied by the tightening of security
14Ford, 246.
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measures, particularly those designed to protect the lives of government and
military leaders. As tensions escalate, even before the outbreak of violence, the
opportunity for successfully defeating the security measures designed to protect
leadership diminishes. The men who bring their nations to war, ironically, are
safest from the prospect of being killed in war. 15
Assassination has also been generally rare during extremes of repression
and perceived social injustice. 16 Great tyrants, like leaders during times of war,
are protected by the very repression which make them deserving targets. Indeed,
it is more often the successor regime, after relaxing the measures of repression,
that pays for the sins of their predecessors. 17
In order to circumvent the security which normally surrounds military and
civilian leadership, and which is customarily fortified during times of heightened
tension or armed violence, assassins would require enormously detailed
intelligence. These requirements would necessitate meticulous collection. Before
Israeli commandos assassinated Khalil al-Wazir, MOSSAD, Israel's intelligence
agency, observed his comings and goings from his home in Tunisia for five
years. 18 Assassination, therefore, can be a vehicle for swift reaction or reprisal







would require a degree of foresight and premeditation which is uncharacteristic
of American foreign policy in general. 19 Assassination, it would seem, is better
suited as an instrument in a long term conflagration, also uncharacteristic of
recent trends in American warfighting style.
Beyond the operational complexities lies an institutional obstacle to
achieving a reliable assassination capability: identifying agents to "pull the
trigger." Should America draw its assassins from its own military and intelligence
resources, or should it employ surrogates from the targeted country? Either
solution raises troublesome practical and philosophical concerns.
Certain of America's Special Operations Forces could achieve a reliable
assassination capability with minimal specialized training and equipment. But
American soldiers are not assassins. As John Rawls argues, "even in a just war
certain forms of violence are strictly inadmissible; and where a country's right
to war is questionable and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are
all the more severe."20 Contrary to conventional beliefs, value systems and ethics
are not peripheral to warfare, but constitute its basis and driving force. Ethics,
enshrined and codified in war convention are intended to protect not only the
l9Furthermore, U.S. intelligence is poorly designed for this type of real-time
intelligence gathering which depends highly on agents in the field, or human
intelligence. Traditional emphasis on technological means has atrophied this
capability. In his confirmation hearings, Robert Gates spoke of the need to
enhance human intelligence. See Cropsey, B4.
20John Rawls, A Theory of lustice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1971), 379.
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belligerent nations but the soldiers themselves. Therefore, since man's first
excursions into mortal combat with his fellow man, he has sought to regulate it
and subject it to limitations. 21 Without clearly circumscribed conventions
dictating who can and cannot be killed, and by what means, an army is little
more than a mob, a soldier little more than a murderer.
The line separating killing in war from murder is arbitrary, but it is
absolutely essential. Van Creveld points out that war without this demarcation
is not only a monstrosity, but an impossibility. "Where this distinction is not
preserved society will fall to pieces, and war—as distinct from mere indiscriminate
violence—becomes impossible."22 When a soldier enlists, he accepts the risk that,
in time of war, he may be killed by a belligerent counterpart. Furthermore, his
killer may do so with impunity. It is widely agreed that this is morally legitimate
homicide. When a civilian official takes office, however, he assumes no such
risk.23 There is no political code that makes him a legitimate military target.
21Some disagree that war should be or could be regulated. In Vom Crieg,
Clausewitz presents war as subject to no rules except those of the political
purpose for which it is made. "In dangerous things such as war, errors made out
of kindness are the worst." Herbert Spenser, Friedrich Hackel, and other "social-
darwinists" proclaim that war is simply a mechanism for natural selection.
Humanity, therefore, is irrelevant in battle. Expediency should be the only
consideration. For a detailed presentation of these viewpoints, see Van Creveld,
63-66.
^Van Creveld, 90.
^Some argue that if a political leader wears a uniform or holds military rank
he becomes a legitimate target. This argument lacks substance. Equitable
international relations require that the leader of any sovereign state must be
treated as such. U.S. presidents do not wear uniforms, yet they function as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The difference between U.S. presidents
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Killing a political official, therefore, is ethically tantamount to intentionally killing
an ordinary citizen—murder. When soldiers become assassins, therefore, they
must hurtle "moral fortifications" established by military tradition "that can be
stormed only at great moral cost."24 The ethical justifications which make
soldiers possible will begin to decay.
Despite its moralistic overtones, this is a pragmatic argument. Abrogation
of war conventions, beyond the injurious effects it will have on the soldier, may
weaken the offending nation's ability to wage war. Sun Tzu understood this. He
listed "the favor of heaven" as the first condition for success in war.25
Subordinating the normative conception of "good" to the obscure notion of
national interest would have seemed ludicrous to Sun Tzu.26 Although "the
favor of heaven" is difficult to quantify, the experiences of the United States in
Vietnam and the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan vindicate this claim.
Disregarding moral beliefs objectifies the troops in the field. "Soon such an army
will cease to fight, each man seeking only to save his conscience and his skin."27
and their uniformed counterparts, therefore, is one of appearance and not kind.
Until a uniformed leader physically joins the battle, he is no more a legitimate
target than any other political leader.
24Michael Walzer, Tust and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
Publishers, 1977), 130.
25Van Creveld, 127.
26The perspective of the national interest as the raison d'etre for state policy
is both Eurocentric- and modern.
27Van Creveld, 93.
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The willingness of a soldier to risk his life is limited unless he perceives both ends
and means as just.
Further complicating the question is the legal status of the soldier himself.
Just as a soldier serving as an assassin may feel himself to be something other
than a soldier, the enemy will certainly consider him otherwise. As Walzer points
out, if apprehended, an assassin cannot claim the same protection as a soldier
under of the rules governing prisoners of war. "Political killing imposes risks
quite unlike those of combat, risks whose character is best revealed by the fact
that there is no such thing as benevolent quarantine for the duration of the
political struggle."28 Placing an American serviceman in this dubious status is
morally contentious in any circumstance other than a struggle for national
survival.
Returning to an issue of operational pragmatism reveals the final argument
against U.S. servicemen as assassins. Assassination is more likely to succeed if
it is an "inside job." Ideally, an assassin would be capable of moving freely
within the enemy's cities. Furthermore he should be well connected with
individuals who can knowingly or unknowingly help him get close to his targets.
The CIA recognized this when they sought surrogates within Cuba to assassinate
Castro.
But surrogates also present unique problems. Soldiers can be emotionally
detached from their targets. An indigenous assassin will not share this
*Walzer, 201.
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detachment. He may have a political agenda and an attitude about violence quite
different from the American version.29 Former Director of Central Intelligence
Richard Helms suggests that:
If [assassination] is done by surrogates whom you've trained in the black arts
and given a suitable cover, there is a whole other set of problems. If you've
recruited them from dissidents who have an ideological motivation, they may
be very hard to control. You may think you've called the operation off and
wake up one morning and find that they've gone and done it anyway.30
The arguments presented thus far indicate the complexities of waging war
against a specific individual. But if these operational complexities can be
overcome, if an assassination is successful, what will have been accomplished?
The most difficult questions start here.
2. An Exaggerated Linkage?
Advocates of assassination make the monumental assumption that ridding
the world of one man would make the world, or at least the United States, a
happier place. Chapter Four presented a theoretical argument supporting this
assumption. But historical analysis calls these theories into question. This section
argues that the linkage between one man, even a national leader, and the
disagreeable policies which his nation may embrace, is too often exaggerated. In
29
Jenkins, "Assassination," 10.
30Cited in George J. Church, "The Problems with Retaliation," Time, 8 July
1985,20.
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order to support this argument, this section hypothetically considers an
alternative outcome to the failed assassination attempts against Adolf Hitler.
Reaching a consensus on an historical figure whose premature demise
would have favorably influenced history would not be difficult. A target with
"clearer credentials for extinction"31 than Hitler would be hard to find. But
precisely because the case for assassination appears incontrovertible in this
instance, it demonstrates that no case is.
Closer scrutiny reveals complexities which are often distorted when viewed
through the lens of hindsight. When we recover our historical perspective, we
immediately find that the question "when" is problematic.32 An observer prior
to 1939, when Hitler's death may have been preemptory, would find it difficult
to comprehend the Hitler which historical investigation has since uncovered.
Certainly the observer would agree that he was a ruthless megalomaniac, a racist,
and an expansionist. But these characteristics are not sufficient to identify a
leader for assassination. As Brian Jenkins points out, "Megalomania, racism, and
a proclivity to invade one's neighbor, regrettably, are not rare attributes among
31Ford, 280.
32The question "how" is equally troublesome. Hitler confessed that he was
always vulnerable to an attack from a "dedicated gunman." Yet he survived
numerous attempts. This not only points to the operational frictions involved in
an assassination, but also Adolf Hitler's abundant "good luck." Ever since World
War I, it seemed that "mystical providence" had concluded that the only bullet
that could claim Hitler's life would be his own.
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world leaders."33 Answering "yes" to "wouldn't you have killed Hitler?"
presumes perfect knowledge.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that one of the many attempts to
assassinate Hitler had succeeded. Measuring what might have occurred against
what did occur can prove nothing. It is useful here, however, because it
discredits the certainty of the conclusion that Hitler's assassination would have
been an unqualified blessing. A contrary conclusion is equally compelling.
The popular projection predicts that Hitler's death would have ended the
Second World War, saved millions who would otherwise die in battle and
prevented the slaughter of European Jews. But this happy outcome assumes a
great deal.34 First, it assumes that the conspiracy would have spontaneously
incited, presumably through the cooperation of the military, the overthrow of the
Nazi hierarchy, the defeat of the SS and the Gestapo, and the establishment of a
constitutional regime. Furthermore, it assumes that the Allies, despite their
previous demands for Germany's unconditional surrender and Stalin's
expansionist ambitions, could have concluded cease-fire agreements on both
fronts agreeable to still-formidable Germany. This scenario also disregards the
complications of withdrawing unbeaten Wehrmacht divisions from Scandinavia,
the Balkans and France. Capitulation under these circumstances would conjure
memories of the "unnecessary, surrender" of 1918.
33
Jenkins, "Assassination," 3.
^For a detailed presentation of these assumptions see Ford, 285.
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Rather than disintegrating, the Nazi Party could have exploited Hitler's
assassination to strengthen German resolve.35 Hitler's own rise to power
benefitted from the image of Germany's defeat in World War I as a betrayal, a
"stab in the back." In all probability, the inheritors of the beheaded regime would
have used this image once again. Furthermore, if Germany had not seized the
opportunity of Hitler's demise to escape the war, the Wehrmacht would have
achieved a dreadful advantage. Hitler's strategic ineptitude had repeatedly
frustrated his military leaders. With the Fuhrer out of the way, the Wehrmacht
would have been free to pursue the war differently. Had Hitler been eliminated
prior to Barbarossa, for example, a very different outcome to the Second World
War is conceivable.36
The Hitler case suggests that advocates of assassination place an
extraordinarily high value on a single individual. This viewpoint is not without
intellectual foundations. The Carlyle approach to history focuses on great men.37
Writing in the nineteenth century, Thomas Carlyle argued that certain individuals,
because they possessed specific qualities, have been irreplaceable forces in history.
But Carlyle's concept of the historical hero is misinterpreted by those who
advocate assassination. It is an historical approach not a prescription for policy.
35
Ibid., 285-286.
%For a detailed presentation of this argument, see R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's
Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted, (Norman and London: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1992).
37See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History
(New York: E. P. Dutton, 1934).
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Carlyle's approach is a method of understanding history, not preempting it. Like
all analytical tools, it facilitates understanding by simplifying reality. Thus, the
linkage between the raid and the curtailment of Libyan sponsored terrorism may
be an oversimplification.38 Likewise, Saddam Hussein's demise would not have
guaranteed peace in Iraq. "Iraqis are responsible for this horrific regime," says
Iraqi exile Samir al-Khalil, author of Republic of Fear .39 "It is a product of trends
in political culture in this part of the world." Qaddafi, Hussein and others who
U.S. popular opinion would have exterminated, are symptoms of deeper ills
within their perspective nations. The logic of assassination equates a political
leader to a chess player manipulating his unreactive and uninvolved pieces. It
is an oversimplification of reality and a dreadful exaggeration. Taken to its
ultimate expression, this distortion of reality is pernicious indeed.
3. Costs Unseen and Unseeable
The arguments presented above contain the essence of the final practical
argument against political assassination: its unpredictable nature. No body of
military experts, area specialists, political scientists or fortune tellers could ever
gather enough information to conclude that an assassination would serve their
^he conclusion that Qaddafi's brush with death in the 1986 bombing raid
significantly curtailed Libyan sponsored terrorism discounts other, less visible
pressures, particularly economic pressures, which were brought to bear
concurrently with the military response. Furthermore, the conclusion that




purposes. Although no foreign policy decision is without uncertainty, the
decision to assassinate a military or political leader is virtually unmanageable.
Chalmers Johnson's model of revolution describes an "X-factor" as a key
ingredient for the outbreak of revolution.40 His X-factor is a chance occurrence
which impacts a set of social conditions in a unique, unanticipated and
imponderable manner. No amount of analysis can predict the arrival or the
consequences of an X-factor. Such a variable can only warn us that human
endeavors are fraught with unforseen catalysts which propel history.
Johnson's concept of an X-factor, taken beyond its original context, is also
helpful for our discussion. The assassination of an important political or military
leader will project the targeted organization, nation, or set of policies in some
direction away from the status quo. But history tells us that predicting that
direction is problematic. Using Johnson's terminology, assassination is not a
decisive strategy with readily articulated goals, but an artificially manufactured
X-factor~a marginally informed roll of the dice.
The assassination of Julius Caesar illustrates the unpredictable character of
political assassination. Caesar's death ensured, as nothing else could have, the
complete realization of Caesar's ambition to replace the Roman aristocratic
republic by a democratic monarchy. His assassins made quite inevitable that
which they assassinated him to preclude. "It is one of history's greatest jokes,"
40See Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964).
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writes Edward Hyams, "that the assassination of Julius Caesar accomplished
precisely what his assassins, justified in their deed by the interests of their party,
were seeking by killing him to avoid: their own final destruction and the
establishment of the new monarchy."41 This was an incalculable consequence.
Caesar's assassination was the X-factor accelerating the destruction of the old
oligarchy.
The Caesar case also illustrates, once again, the extraordinary intelligence
requirements necessary to predict the outcome of an assassination. Even perfect
target data is insufficient. Intelligence collection must also concern itself with
systemic questions. Is the regime cohesive and likely to act decisively and in
unison if attacked? Or is it divided by conflicting claims ambitions and loyalties?
Who commands the armed forces and where do his loyalties lie? What control
does the regime have over the modes of communication? How effective is its
propaganda? It is impossible to present more than probabilities on many of these
matters. More elusive still is the difficult question of historical implication and
the virtually unmanageable question of psychological impact.
The most fundamental questions concern the political heir of the victim.
Yet even these are onerous. Every political and military system, national and sub-
national, has a mechanism for the replacement of its leaders as they die, retire,
resign or disappear. The history of most organizations does not end with the
death of their leaders. An assassination, therefore, is logical only if the
41Hyams, 67.
105
assassinating party can predict a new leader who is more benign or less effective
than his predecessor.
But the character of a successor is particularly difficult to estimate in
authoritarian states or secretive organizations where the voices and opinions of
the lieutenants are muted. In 1973, Israeli agents killed Mohammed Boudia, an
Algerian who had orchestrated Palestinian terrorist operations in Western Europe.
His replacement, "Carlos", represented a significant step in the wrong direction.
Among the possible successors for Yasir Arafat is the man who planned the
bloody attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. If U.S. bombs
had fallen differently, Qaddafi may well have been replaced by one of his
lieutenants running Libya's terrorist apparatus.42 The uncertainty of succession
points once again to the unpredictability inherent in assassination. If a more
effective or ruthless replacement assumes the mantle on a mandate of revenge,
then assassination is counter-productive.
A final uncertainty compels introspection. Can the United States protect
its own leadership? If a team of dedicated assassins could have been trained by
the British, Russians or Americans to kill Hitler, then certainly the Germans could
have trained assassins to kill Churchill, Stalin or Roosevelt. Indeed, the United
States may find itself with a comparative disadvantage in this regard. Jenkins






Assassination of major political figures is a relatively rare phenomenon in
authoritarian regimes where security measures are rigorous. In democratic
societies, security measures cannot be as rigidly enforced. Indeed, the efficacy of
a democracy depends on contact between politicians and their constituents.44
According to Carl Sandburg, Lincoln once said that the only effective way to
avoid all risk was to "shut himself up in an iron box," where he could not
possibly perform the duties of president. Lincoln went on to say, "in a country
like this, where our habits are simple, and must be, assassination is always
possible, and will come if they are determined upon it"45
In war, belligerents must fight in a manner consistent with the ultimate
goal of securing the peace. Walzer, quoting Sidgwick, argues that war must be
fought so as to avoid "the danger of provoking reprisals and of causing bitterness
that will long outlast" the fighting. 46 Military conduct thought to be
unnecessarily brutal or widely regarded as illegitimate may ultimately result in
festering resentment, engender a sense of scores unsettled, and invite retaliation
in kind. Those who advocate assassination as an instrument of foreign policy
must consider whether America is prepared for the repercussions of it actions.
'"Murray Clark Havens, Carl Leiden, and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of
Assassination (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 11.
43Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc., 1939), 210.
"Walzer, 132.
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In summary, this section presented practical arguments against
assassination. It suggested that the operational difficulties associated with
assassination are often overlooked. Furthermore, identifying assassins and then
controlling them during an operation presents institutional as well as
philosophical complexities. If these complexities can be overcome, we see that it
is difficult to establish definitively the link between an assassination and national
goals. Indeed, since measuring the desirability of a successor is problematic,
assassination could be counterproductive. Finally if the United States engages
in this kind of activity, it may be particularly vulnerable to retaliation in kind.
These arguments are compelling in terms compatible with the outlooks of
idealists as well as realists. The next section presents a purely idealist
perspective. For realists, this argument may be heresy.
B. THE PRICE OF REALPOLITIK
President Bush's coinage, "the new world order," is widely misunderstood.
Those who see this provocative image as a plan of action, or as a national goal
fail to acknowledge the revolutionary character of the day. Indeed, these
misinterpretations define one who is confined to a bygone conceptual framework.
The notion of a new world order reflects a fundamental understanding that
the world has changed. Neither a promise of Utopia nor a preface to a modern
American crusade, it represents only the recognition that a profound restructuring
has occurred, the ultimate resolution of which remains uncertain.
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A structural change of this magnitude calls for a perceptual change that is
equally profound. The conceptual framework which has traditionally guided
international relations is fading into irrelevance. The new world order
necessitates a paradigm shift, a new way of understanding global realities.
Failure to recognize this ignores the magnitude of the modern dynamic and
forfeits the opportunity of contributing to the direction of the changes. Business
as usual is irresponsible.
A revaluation of the elements that define national power should accompany
this paradigm shift. This section argues that a fundamental reorientation in the
typology of power has occurred. In the context of this reorientation,
assassination, perceived as a policy which is contradictory to democratic norms,
will be deleterious to America's power position.
1. Ideology and National Power
One of the principle determinants of the modern era has been the
seventeenth century concept of the nation state. The fundamental characteristic
of the nation state is its sovereignty. It possesses absolute power to determine its
interests and absolute moral sanction to achieve them.
If humankind has profited from the nation state, it has done so at a cost.
In the twentieth century, the nation state has been associated with wars of
unprecedented destruction, arms races, resource depletion and environmental
damage. Confined by concepts too narrow for the problems of global
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interdependence, the nation state is no longer an effective unit of governance.47
"There are many threats to humankind and the planet itself," writes Frank Teti,
"that require a wider perspective than that of national interest."48 The efficacy
of the nation state is facing a credibility problem.
The character of power associated with the nation state is primarily
military and economic. But as we look toward a fundamental paradigm shift, we
are certain only of this: that traditional wisdom is not the answer. "We are being
forced to redesign our spectrum of possibilities."49 It is very likely that military
and economic might will continue to be important sources of global influence.
But some argue that ideological power will gain prominence, and perhaps
preeminence, in the new global system. When adherence to an ideology
mobilizes and defines the nation, the force of values determines national power.
This could be a dangerous situation indeed if religious fundamentalism, political-
economic absolutism, or mystical racism dominates the ideological milieu. This
could also be a infinitely desirable situation if post-modern ideology is, instead,
informed by the values of the open society: pluralism, tolerance and compromise.
The United States should be eminently prepared for such a reorientation.
These values gave the Republic its identity. The hallmark of the American value
system is its ability to accommodate diverse cultures while preserving political
47
Fritjof Capra, The Turnine Point (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), 398.





order.50 Ethnic diversity and traditions of consensus building and compromise
enhance America's credibility in the world and identify it as a natural leader in
a paradigm characterized by a global perspective.
Pursuing the logic of an ideological power base, it is evident that the
United States can maintain its relative power position only if it remains
committed to these principles. Assassination challenges democratic norms at two
points. First, it objectifies the individual. This is a natural tendency, indeed an
imperative, in war.51 But an assassination, even in the context of war, denies the
victim the right to life which only soldiers surrender. Secondly, it calls to
question America's traditional appeal to the rule of law. The ideas of due process
and the rights of the accused are obscured when a nation determines guilt in
absentia and proceeds with the execution. Regarding values as extraneous, as
champions of political assassination do, threatens to decay vital elements of
America's power base. It threatens America's moral legitimacy.
2. The Force of Example
Some Americans, frustrated by a world of pirates, chieftains and Third
World crusaders, look with envy toward Israel. Israel operates in an environment
comparatively free from the moral restrictions which the United States has
D
°Recent trends in racial discord within the United States challenge this
statement. Seen in this context, racism is more than a domestic scourge. It
threatens America's power position in the world.
51For an interesting discussion on objectification in war see John W. Dower,
War Without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
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voluntarily shouldered. Military response, therefore, need not be considered
through the cryptic lens of perceived world opinion. Old Testament justice is
sanction enough.
This envy is indicative of a narrow perspective indeed. The geopolitical
pressures facing Israel and the United States are profoundly different. Israel is
a small, insecure country surrounded by neighbors whom would welcome its
extinction. Self preservation is necessarily Israel's pervasive consideration. Its
sense of immediate and grave danger, although attenuated in recent years,
remains powerful enough to produce general consensus on its methods.
Nevertheless, Israel has earned, however unfairly, a reputation as a pariah
state.
52 This is not an enviable circumstance.
The United States, by contrast, is a huge country with non-threatening
neighbors. Its dominant imperative must transcend simple survival. "There is
much else that we might plausibly want to preserve," writes Walzer. "The quality
of our lives, for example, our civilization and morality, our collective abhorrence
of murder, even when it seems, as it always does, to serve some purpose."53
Calculating utility based exclusively on comparative body count estimates
disregards American history which still embraces as heroes those who killed and
died for democratic ideals.
'2Gregory F. Treverton, "The Ethics of Covert Intervention," International
journal Spring 1988, 309.
53Walzer, 262.
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The point is sometimes made that "there is a direct relation between the
health of liberty in the United States and the health of liberty in other societies.
Disease in one is likely to infect the other."54 The United States cannot
effectively promote democracy in other countries unless its own house is in order.
Thus Stanley Hoffmann argues, "like charity, well-ordered crusades begin at
home."55 The degree to which assassination violates democratic principle is
arguable. But legalistic debating notwithstanding, the anti-democratic perception
which assassination promotes is undeniable. Low cost victories accomplished
through an assassin's cross hairs, therefore, will seem ambiguous, transitory and
not nearly such a bargain when compared with the costs to America's image in
the world.
Realists would reject these concerns on two grounds. First they would
contend that the health of liberty in other societies is inconsequential. Here the
realists are guilty of myopic thinking. Advancing the democratic cause is not
simply a good deed, it is a foreign policy position that promotes America's self-
interest. A more democratic world is likely to be a more peaceful world. 56 The
history of war between democracies in the modern world is virtually the null
^Huntington presents this argument but does not completely subscribe to it.
See Huntington, 12.
"Stanley Hoffmann, "No Choice, No Illusions:' Foreign Policy, Winter 1976-77,
127.




57 Immanuel Kant's philosophies contain an explanation for the relative
peacefulness between democracies.
[When]the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war
should be declared, it is very natural that they will have a great hesitation in
embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down
on themselves all the miseries of war . . . But under a constitution . . . which
is . . . not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For
the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will
not force him to make the slightest sacrifice.58
Democracy is a system which promotes essentially ethical decision-making.
The second realist objection is that idealists exaggerate the impact of the
U.S. example. There is empirical evidence which discredits this objection. The
students who marched for democracy in Beijing took as their symbol a replica of
the Statue of Liberty. When protestors in Czechoslovakia called a general strike
in the fall of 1989, the New York Times reported that soon after the strike began,
a brewery worker rose on a platform to proclaim: "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator
with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness."59 On the occasion of the overthrow of Rumanian dictator Nicolae
57See R.J. Rummel, "The Freedom Factor," Reason, July 1983, 32-38. See also
Muravchik, 8. Muravchik presents Paul Gottfried and Patrick Buchanan's
contrary example of England who declared war on democratic Finland in World
War II.
58Immanuel Kant, Kanfs Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 100.
'9Esther B. Fein, "Unshackled Czech Workers Declare Their Independence,"
New York Times, 28 November, 1989, Al.
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Ceausescu, a writer and film maker active in the rebellion told the Washington
Post, "[We] live at the moment of 1776."60 History suggests that America's
actions are not only judged, but emulated.
Finally, what of America's self-image? Brian Jenkins poses a hypothetical
scenario.
Just imagine the President appearing on television one evening to announce,
"Some time ago I authorized the assassination of Muamar Qaddafi. I am
pleased to report to you tonight that American agents have successfully
carried out this mission."61
The reaction of the American public to such an announcement would be
dramatically divided.
Sometimes a single image is in itself a watershed event. The process is as
irrational as the consequences are profound. Witness the image of the head of the
South Vietnamese Police, Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc, executing the captured
Viet Cong officer within a few hours of the outbreak of the Tet offensive. Some
suggest that its impact was the turning point of the war. 62 The United States
entered the 1960s confident of the perfectibility of America, conscious of its
60
Blaine Harden, "Ceausescu, Wife Reported Executed after Trial: Army





See, for example, Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976), 356.
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historic mission and, above all, united. A decade later, that consensus lay in
ruins.
The American consensus63 rests on an ideology. The Vietnam War,
however inaccurate this perception may be, came to symbolize contradictions in
that ideology. The result was social upheaval. Political assassination similarly
threatens to contradict democratic norms. How, then, would American society
react to the revelation that its government had summarily executed a foreign
leader. 64 Are Americans so logical, so calculating, so dispassionate that they can
rationalize value-free foreign policy? The experience of the 1960s and 1970s
suggests that we are not.
C CONCLUSIONS
Maintenance of American values is hard. The dilemma of balancing Athens
with Sparta is particularly difficult when the threats to global security are genuine
and traceable to an irrational or criminal few. The rational, and perhaps moral,
tendency is to strike back directly at the source. This chapter has argued that this
tendency is fraught with dangerous practical and philosophical nuances.
63Consensus here refers to a general belief system, rather than agreement on
specific issues.
MThe counter-argument that an operation such as this would be conducted
covertly and therefore without the knowledge of the American public ignores the
history of U.S. covert operations. One of the most striking features of this history
is the tendency for decision-makers to presume that covert operations would
remain secret. This presumption makes it easy to ignore ethical questions.
However, the record shows that this presumption is flawed.
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What then are we to do with the arguments contained in the previous
chapters? We have identified variables which appear to be, at the same time,
incompatible and inextricable. This is the essence of the deadly dilemma.
"The tension between liberal ideal and institutional reality," writes Huntington,
"is America's distinguishing cleavage." He continues:
It defines both the agony and the promise of American politics. If that tension
disappears, the United States of America, as we have known it, will no longer
exist.
65
American foreign policy must acknowledge this dissonance, abandoning neither
element, yet acknowledging that either extreme is intellectually impoverished.
How can a government frame principles of conduct in the milieu of this
dissonance? This is the salient question in the debate over assassination and the
focus of the final chapter.
65Huntington, 16.
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VI. ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA
In 1974, Brian Jenkins remarked that "warfare in the future will be less
coherent. Warfare will cease to be finite." 1 Today, in many respects, his
observations are realized. One manifestation of the growing incoherence of
warfare is the evolution of global threats which do not adhere to the widely
accepted principles of the past As the United States confronts adversaries whose
organizations and objectives are structured along personal lines, the meaning of
Jenkins's words become abundantly clear. The modern strategic milieu defies
Clausewitzian logic and challenges political and military thinkers to reevaluate
traditional wisdom.
Some argue that such a reevaluation will deliver U.S. policy from the fetters
of an illusory global morality. A reality informed by utilitarian calculations alone
will emerge to render moralistic charters, such as the assassination ban, absurd.
If a threat to U.S. national interests assumes a personal character, then the counter
to that threat is justified, in the name of expedience, to do the same. This paper
has presented three arguments favoring this orientation.
First, assassination may be an effectual vehicle for waging war in a Third
World regional or low intensity conflict. The demise of a dictator or charismatic
'Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," research
paper no. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy (Los
Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1974), 4.
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leader may precipitate disarray and a struggle for power, thus facilitating the
undoing of a disagreeable regime. Targeting military leaders may also provide
a momentary tactical or psychological advantage which could accelerate war
termination. At a sub-national level, terrorist organizations may provide no
target, other than the terrorist himself, valuable enough for a military response.
Another sub-national consideration is counterinsurgency warfare, the success of
which may depend on specifically identifying and eliminating, through arrest or
attrition, individuals of the political infrastructure in the countryside. The
executive order not only denies the United States these warfighting alternatives,
but, because of its vague language, it also renders ambiguous the legality of
related, yet completely legitimate, options. Witness the Bush Administration's
decision to withhold U.S. support from the failed coup attempt in Panama in
1989.
Second, a successful assassination can save lives. Conventional military force
is a blunt instrument indeed when compared to an assassination. If an
assassination, or a campaign of assassinations, can preclude the necessity of a
conventional military response, then it preserves the lives of soldiers on both
sides of a conflagration as well as the non-combatants who inevitably perish in
any large scale conflict. If assassination is pursued in conjunction with, rather
than lieu of, a conventional war, then war makers need look no further for moral
authority than the lives saved by a more expeditious conclusion of the conflict.
Moreover, assassination may also save lives by preempting a greater evil. If an
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Adolf Hitler can be identified and eliminated before he realizes his gruesome
ambitions, then failure to eliminate him is itself immoral.
The third argument which supports the recision of a clear prohibition is the
deterrent value of an ambiguous policy towards assassination. It is increasingly
evident that traditional deterrence doctrine is flawed vis-a-vis the forces which
threaten global security today. Modern deterrence requires a threat with a more
personal message.
Squaring off against these three compelling arguments are the practical
constraints and philosophical complexities presented in the previous chapter.
Together they number six. First, assassination, if attempted, is a highly complex
operation. Defeating the security which surrounds military and political
leadership may prove to be prohibitively difficult. This obstacle was less relevant
in the days of the Hashishiyyin who held no expectations of returning alive from
their missions. 2 But the impulse to undertake suicide missions has never been a
part of America's warfighting tradition. Security, therefore, is an imposing
obstacle.
The second argument against assassination is the difficulty of identifying
agents to carry out such an operation. If left to surrogates who would enjoy free
movement within the targeted state, American political and military leaders
would have little control over the endeavor. Delegating this mission to U.S.
military or intelligence operatives, on the other hand, ensures control but ravages
2Hyams, 34.
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the moral fortifications of military conventions which have traditionally protected
Americans engaged in armed violence.
Third, there is very little evidence to suggest that assassination can accomplish
its purpose. Indeed, as the conspirators against Caesar discovered, a contrary
effect is just as likely. The linkage between a specific individual, particularly at
the level of national leadership, and a disagreeable policy which his nation or
organization may embrace, is often exaggerated and, as we saw in the Hitler
example, never completely clear.
Fourth, predicting a successor is problematic. An assassination serves its
agents only when the political heir of the victim is either more benign or less
effective in manifesting his malignancy. Making this determination may be
perplexing, however, since both identity and character of potential successors are
often veiled by the reigning personality.
Fifth, if the United States chooses to assassinate its enemies, then, having set
the moral agenda, it invites retaliation in kind. The United States may not be
prepared for this type of an exchange. Indeed, in a war of attrition from the top,
an open, democratic society suffers an inherent disadvantage.
Finally, military and economic power alone will not be sufficient to command
a leading role in the new world order. The power of ideals will share ascendancy
as a determinant of global power. Assassination, perceived by many to contradict
democratic norms, will therefore weaken America's global credibility and corrode
its domestic consensus.
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After five chapters we can conclude only this: the issue of assassination in
American foreign policy is indeed a dilemma. With this acknowledgement,
however, we distinguish ourselves from a substantial body of commentators who
speak in absolute terms. The executive order, for example, was conceived and
drafted in a moral crisis~a political milieu in which absolutes were the order of
the day. Therein lies the deficiency of the assassination ban. Many of the
arguments which advocate assassination similarly disregard its paradoxical
character. The remainder of this paper suggests alternatives for structuring
coherent policy on the horns of a dilemma.
A. POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Confronted with an issue never specifically considered by the law, policy
makers must determine whether the law requires modification or if the inherent
flexibility of existing laws and institutions is sufficient to accommodate the
phenomenon. If the former, then policy toward that issue is exceptionalistic;
policy makers treat the matter as an exception to business as usual and affect
fundamental adjustments. If the latter, then policy is normalistic; policy makers
rely on conventions already in force to contain the matter in question. This
section considers political assassination in the context of these categories.
1. The Exceptionalistic Approach
Clearly the executive order exceptionalized political assassination. It
established a national policy where there had been none. Furthermore, as
Chapter Four argued, it did so in a formalistic manner, circumscribing executive
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power without affording flexibility. Should the United States continue to embrace
such an intractable charter?
There are two reasons why, perhaps, it should. The first is that, although
the executive order may cast a broad shadow, there is no doubt that its footprint
proscribes "assassination writ large." Chapter Five presented compelling evidence
that assassination in the classical sense is an entirely inadequate foreign policy
solution. Besides being morally dubious, it is an uncertain instrument at best.
Therefore, if there is indeed the danger of a "rogue elephant" in the government,
as there may have been during the period spanning the attempts on Castro's life,
then it is meet that policy tame this elephant.
But the commendable mission of taming the rogue elephant is not served
by shooting it. During the days of the Church Committee, the degree of
congressional moralizing seemed to indicate that the existence of the CIA was
tenuous.3 Yet, unlike President Ford, many members questioned the wisdom of
legislation explicitly banning assassination. Instead, Congress instituted oversight.
Congress sought to tame the rogue elephant without imposing formalistic legal
structures which might not be responsive to future crises.
The second, and best, reason for exceptionalizing policy toward
assassination is that, by doing so, the United States provides an example for the
world. Despite the objections of the realists, the U.S. national interest does not
3Indeed, the Committee gave serious consideration to proposing a total ban
on all forms of covert action. See Dycus, Berney, Banks and Raven-Hansen, 319.
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stop at its shorelines. The national interest is structured by a framework of value
oriented goals: to preserve and promote democratic ideals. The U.S. national
interest is served, therefore, when America's example of embracing these ideals
is emulated. The assassination ban, as a monument to American respect for the
rule of law, may provide such an example.
Since the assassination ban has been in force since 1976, it should be
possible at this time to assess the influence of its example. The best measure of
the force of an example is to determine how widely that example is emulated.
The data is not promising. No other nation has issued a similar proclamation.
This should prompt the United States to check the pulse of its example.
One explanation for the assassination ban's deficiency as an example is that
those who the United States aims to influence through its example see the
assassination ban as a cosmetic accessory to U.S. policy; a garnish to be set aside
at the slightest provocation. Some argue that when the United States bombed
Libya in 1986, it openly contradicted its own self-proclaimed restraint. The nature
of some of the air strikes during the Gulf War is now cultivating similar
indictments. The validity of these allegations is moot. Only perceptions are at
issue here. If these notions represent prevalent perceptions, then America's
shining example is critically tarnished. Indeed, the prohibition becomes a liability.
Whenever U.S. actions appear to contradict its ideals, American ethics are
criticized domestically and abroad as situational, its politics capricious, its rhetoric
empty.
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The American example is further invalidated if it is an example of
weakness. "The power of example," writes Huntington, "works only when it is
an example of power."4 If U.S. institutions and ideals render the United States
impotent vis-a-vis infinitely weaker nations or sub-national entities, they will not
be emulated. "In short, no one copies a loser."5
American ideals will serve as an example only if a balance is achieved
between enhancing and voluntarily limiting U.S. power abroad. This requires
flexibility in American foreign policy. Exceptionalistic policy is inherently
inflexible. Since this approach to policy specifies an issue as unique from others,
the guidelines it establishes must also be specific. Rather than enhancing
flexibility, exceptionalistic policy is usually manifest in formalistic structure, a list
of explicit proscriptive canons. Exceptionalistic policy, therefore, renders statutes,
not people, as the determinants of international relations, a topic which, according
to George Kennan, is too intricate to "suffer any total taboos."6
2. Normalizing Political Assassination
Normalizing assassination policy fixes the burden of moral deliberation on
existing democratic institutions rather than specific laws. This, according to John
Locke's concept of the "social contract," is appropriate. As he wrote in An Essay






be done with foreigners, depending much upon their actions and the variations
of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those who
have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill for
the advantage of the Commonwealth."7
Entrusting America's moral purpose to the "prudence" of the government
certainly requires watchfulness. Regulation can assume one of two forms. The
first a strict legal framework, a list of "do's" and "don'ts." Walter Lippmann
explains why this is not the prudent regulatory alternative.
The attempt to construct moral codes on the basis of an inventory is an attempt
to understand something which is always in process of change by treating it as
a still life and taking snapshots of it. That is what moralists have almost always
attempted to do. They have tried to capture the essence of a changing thing in
a collection of fixed concepts. It cannot be done. The reality of human nature
is bound to elude us if we look only at a momentary cross-section of it.8
Policy determined by a legal framework projects itself absolutely. Its efficacy in
the future, therefore, depends on the validity of its drafters' estimations of the
future. If these forecasts are flawed, a likely event, so too is the policy. The
assassination ban exemplifies this manner of regulation. By treating the global
reality of the 1970s as a "still life," the Ford Administration fastened future
administrations to that reality.
7Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, An Essay Concerning the
True Original Extent, and End of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960), 366.
8Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (Boston: Macmillan Company, 1929),
170-171.
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The second form of regulation, a normalistic approach, is to rely on and
strengthen protective institutions. This alternative has many advantages, but
makes a large presumption: that American institutions contain a moral dimension
and are capable of moral deliberation. Huntington presents two reasons why this
may be a valid presumption:
First, because American leaders and decision makers are, inevitably, the
products of their culture. They are themselves generally committed to liberal
and democratic values. This does not mean that some leaders may not at
times take actions that run counter to those values. Obviously, this happens:
sensibilities are dulled, perceived security needs may dictate other actions,
expediency prevails, the immediate end justifies setting aside the larger purpose.
But American policy makers are more likely than those of any other country to
be sensitive to these trade-offs and to be more reluctant to sacrifice liberal-
democratic values.
This argument suggests not only that moral judgement is indeed possible on an
institutional level, but that it is an intrinsic feature of American institutions.
Huntington continues:
Second, the institutional pluralism and dispersion of power in the American
political system impose constraints, unmatched in any other society, on the
ability of officials to abuse power, and also ensure that those transgressions
that do occur will almost inevitably become public knowledge . . . The belief
that the United States can do no wrong in terms of the values of liberty and
democracy is clearly as erroneous abroad as it is at home. But so also is the
belief—far more prevalent in American intellectual circles in the 1970s-that
the United States could never do right in terms of those values.9
Failure of American institutions to reflect American norms will, with few
9Huntington, 11-12.
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exceptions, be exposed either by other formal institutions or, more likely, by
informal institutions such as private interest groups or the free press.
Only the normalistic approach allows adjustment of policy in the light of
discussion and experience. It alone makes it possible to account for the unforseen
consequences of discretionary decisions. It alone allows for fundamental
transformations in the global framework and the character of threats to global
security. "All democratic long-term policy," writes Ka*l Popper, "must be
conceived in terms of impersonal institutions . . . the problem of controlling the
rulers, and of checking their powers, [is] in the main an institutional problem."10
Laws are limited. Any statute, whether it is empowered by the force of
constitutional or international law, or simply a presidential promise, can hold a
community only to those standards which it generally accepts. As Jack Donnelly
notes, "Law cannot make the majority of people or states better than they truly
want to be."n If laws run counter to common wisdom, they simply will not
compel compliance.
Normalizing the issue of assassination allows U.S. foreign policy to
function in a flexible manner. Congressional policy output following the Church
Committee hearings exemplifies the normalistic approach. Congress sought to
arrest the pattern of executive excesses not by imposing specific constraints, but
10Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962), 131.
u
Jack Donnelly, "Humanitarian Intervention: Law, Morality and Politics,"
lournal of International Affairs, Winter 1984, 323.
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rather by improving the process by which decisions are made. The Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980 expanded the reporting procedures established in 1974
under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to ensure that the lines of operational
authority for covert operations were clearly established. 12
The lack of specific prohibitions, a list of "don'ts," does not indicate, as
some have criticized, moral ambiguity. 13 Rather, it exhibits an acknowledgement
of the nuances of the deadly dilemma. The constraints imposed by Congress
exclude no course of action a priori. Yet, by ensuring that existing checks and
balances are robust, they compel moderation and alert policy makers to normative
considerations.
If the United States normalizes its policy toward assassination, then its use
is governed by the same institutions, laws and guidelines which regulate foreign
intervention of any kind. This is not an anarchistic approach, nor does it
disproportionately empower one branch of the government. Normalizing
assassination policy confers the long and successful American tradition of
controlling its leaders through democratic institutions.
3. Recommendations
.
"The worst thing you can do," writes Buckley, "is to attempt to codify rules
governing situations as emotionally and rationally complex as a lover's signal to




his quarry . . . What we need is a blur as thick as the stuff that sits over Los
Angeles, and gums up CIA typewriters."14 Buckley's metaphor suggests that
ambiguity regarding America's philosophy toward assassination is desirable. This
is sound counsel. Ambiguity is the causal nexus between a threat and successful
deterrence. If the threat of assassination is to serve a deterrent role, then it is best
that U.S. intentions remain unclear. A unilateral, self-denying ordinance is
injurious, therefore, since it mitigates uncertainty for a prospective enemy.
But Buckley goes on to champion the current policy toward assassination.
He contends that the abstruseness of the prohibition's language, along with the
general perception that the United States will do as it pleases despite its own
statutes, serves the purpose of establishing the necessary ambiguity. As we have
seen in previous chapters, this aspect of Buckley's argument is flawed for two
reasons. First, because the assassination ban is imprecise at the edges-in cases
that do not fit the classical perception of an assassination—it is an obstacle to,
rather than a vehicle for, flexibility. Second, if the United States projects an image
of a government that makes and breaks laws to serve the utility of the moment,
it jeopardizes its credibility.
Normalizing policy permits assassination to serve as a deterrent threat
against an enemy who may be unmoved by other threats. Furthermore, it
reduces the likelihood that a decision maker, informed by the broadest criteria for
assassination, will fail to act with force when forcible action is appropriate. An
,4Buckley, 63.
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important distinction is necessary, however. The recommendation to normalize
policy toward assassination is not an endorsement of assassination itself as an
instrument of foreign policy. Removing "never" from assassination does not
imply "always" or even "ever." The choice is not between formalized law and
chaos.
Normalizing policy may be less ambitious than establishing legal bindings,
but it may serve the spirit of the executive order better than the ban itself. If the
prohibition were lifted, decision makers could consider the nuances of the deadly
dilemma in an open forum. With the shroud of illegitimacy removed from the
issue, political and military leaders could discuss political assassination without
euphemism or regard for ensuring plausible denial. Informed by institutional
deliberation, decision makers would see assassination for what it is: an
instrument which characaturizes global realities. The chessboard logic of
assassination—that to kill the king is to end the game-is ultimately flawed. Its
proponents invariably oversimplify the complexities of reality, discount long-term
costs for near-term satisfaction, and disregard America's moral purpose.
Informed decision makers must conclude that there is no place for
assassination in America's warfighting arsenal. This, however, is a conclusion
that will not evolve in a milieu of moral absolutism. This acknowledgement
requires cultivation in the fields of political discourse.
The dominant imperative of policy makers facing a policy dilemma such
as the one presented here, must be this: do not make a bad situation worse. This
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paper suggests that the assassination ban, because of its excessive formalism, is
a violation of this imperative. Ours is not a world of absolutes, moral or
otherwise, as the executive order would have it. The best prescription for
preserving a necessary degree of ambiguity while protecting American credibility
abroad, is to rescind the assassination ban and normalize American policy toward
assassination. America's institutional framework for moral judgement, rather than
explicit formalities prescribed by law, should become the centerpiece of
regulation.
4. Recommendations for Future Research
Conspicuously absent from the recommendations presented above is a
discussion of political avenues for achieving a normalized policy toward
assassination. This could be a tempestuous process indeed. Relaxing prohibitions
on the use of force would certainly be resisted. How does a democracy retreat
from a moral platform when it determines that its platform is precarious? If a
nation concludes that it has made an unfortunate ethical decision, what must it
do to correct the situation and avoid similar mistakes in the future? These
questions deserve dedicated analysis. Although this paper does not attempt to
engage them with warranted rigor, it does offer some cursory observations.
If the assassination ban is indeed dysfunctional, then policy makers have
two options: modify it or rescind it. 15 The former would most likely necessitate
15A third option, of course, is to allow the order to continue to be
dysfunctional.
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enhancing the clarity of the ban. If the United States decides that its interests are
indeed best served by a declared prohibition, then the guidelines of that
prohibition should be clear, sharp, and comprehensive; it should be made as
invulnerable as can be to self-serving interpretations or self-denying
misinterpretations.
The second option is rescission of the assassination ban. If Congress had
written the prohibition against assassination into law in the 1970s, outright
recision would be politically infeasible. But because the assassination ban is
contained in an executive order, it can be changed or eliminated "at the whim of
the President." 16 An executive order, therefore, is probably the best form for
exceptionalist policy toward assassination to take. Nevertheless, all laws, even
"presidential laws," express a nation's values. The debate and publicity which
would necessarily accompany a decision to abandon the prohibition outright
would precipitate charges at home and abroad of corruption of American values.
A less dramatic measure for eliminating the assassination ban is to simply
allow it to disappear between administrations. An executive order requires a
presidential signature with each new administration. Each new president,
therefore, has the opportunity to reject the self-imposed constraints of his
predecessors.
A final alternative, and perhaps the only practical, near-term solution, is
to dilute the assassination ban through additional legislation, presidential findings
16George J. Church, "Saddam in the Cross Hairs," Time, 8 October 1990, 29.
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or excessive clarification. Like the Constitution, explication is best accomplished
through the experiences of specific cases. To some degree, this has happened.
After the failed coup in Panama in 1989, the Bush Administration and the
Intelligence Committees agreed that "a decision by the President to employ overt
military force . . . would not constitute assassination if U.S. forces were employed
against the combatant forces of another nation, a guerrilla force, or a terrorist or
other organization whose actions pose a threat to the security of the United
States."
17 Perhaps over time, by actions and assertions, the United States could
shape the assassination ban informally to weaken it beyond relevance or make it
a more nuanced document, sensitive to the deadly dilemma. The cost in doing
so, however, is invoking charges of violation which will inevitably accompany the
erosion of the assassination ban in this manner.
Any retreat from the assassination ban will be politically precarious. The
correct avenue of withdrawal, therefore, is the one which contains risks more
tolerable than those of maintaining the prohibition. If future researchers can
identify such an avenue, then policy makers would be well advised to promptly
take it.
17




Arthur Schlesinger writes, "The American character is indeed filled with
contradiction and paradox. So, in consequence, is American foreign policy." 18
The deadly dilemma is but one example of such a contradiction. The debate over
assassination, therefore, offers insights into a larger inquiry: the function of
morality in national security policy.
The two perspectives which have competed for control of American foreign
policy, realpolitik and the democratic ideal, often fail to coincide in an imperfect
world. But the chasm between the influences of national interest on one hand,
and normative values on the other, is not necessary. Its source lies in the
tendency toward absolute adherence to either. The American political system is
structured upon the Madisonian model of compromise and consensus building.
It is a system which cannot process absolutes.
The choice between moral absolutism and value-free social science, therefore,
does not exhaust the spectrum of American foreign policy alternatives. Indeed,
policy which rejects one for the other is inherently flawed. Any moral dimension
in American foreign policy must also reflect an empirical judgement of the
international reality. Likewise, any expression of Realpolitik which fails to
account for America's moral impulse will ultimately fail to command popular
assent. This imperative of balancing realism and idealism does not become
irrelevant when the United States is forced into a situation which necessitates
l8Schlesinger, 1.
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deadly force. The United States must prevail on the battlefield, but prevail in a
mode consistent with democratic tradition.
The role of morality in American national security policy is that of a compass
to guide America through the ambiguities of reality. Without that compass,
foreign policy loses its purpose. Once the U.S. government abandons its moral
compass, it must be seen as Tolstoy saw all governments: "intricate institutions,
sanctified by tradition and custom for the purpose of committing by force and
with impunity the most revolting crimes." 19
But moral absolutism is equally pernicious. If an expression of morality
becomes intractable, a narrow path which inflexibly imposes the course of
America's actions, then U.S. policy will inevitably collide with the reality of an
anarchical world. Mao Tse-tung once used an historical example to illustrate the
perils of absolute adherence to preordained ethical imperatives. In 638 B.C., the
feudal states of Sung and Chu fought a battle at the Hung River in central
China.20 The Sung forces, led by Duke Hsiang, were already deployed in battle
positions when the numerically superior Chu troops were fording the river.
When the Chu soldiers were halfway across, one of Hsiang's officers suggested
that this was the moment for attack. The Duke refused, replying, "No, a
gentleman should never attack one who is unprepared." When the army had
19Leo Tolstoy quoted in Hyams, 11.
20See Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, 1968), On Protracted War, Mao Tse-tung, note 33, 267.
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crossed the river but had not yet re-formed its lines, the officer again proposed
an attack; again the Duke refused. "No, a gentleman should never attack an
army which has not yet completed its battle alignment." Only after the Chu
soldiers were fully prepared did the Duke signal the attack. In the ensuing battle,
the Sung troops met with a disastrous defeat and Hsiang himself was wounded.
"We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "and we have no use for
his asinine ethics."21
Moral absolutism can lead foreign policy into "asinine ethics" and a position
of defenselessness vis-a-vis the dangerous aspirations of governments or
organizations which are not similarly constrained. Insistence on the perfect
adherence to unclear ethical codes, such as the one expressed in the assassination
ban, threatens to render American power irrelevant. This, according to Paul
Seabury, is among the worst abuses of power. "To withhold power and influence
in some small instances of trouble may be wise; but a known, persistent tendency
to withhold even limited power risks the greater danger that much higher inputs
of power will have to be used later."22 In 1976, Jimmy Carter's presidential
campaign became a referendum on the role of morality in U.S. international






resulted in the collapse of his crusade. The goals of moral absolutism, confronted
by an imperfect reality, proved to be too ambitious.
Surviving the changing patterns of the global political milieu necessitates a
framework for decision making which is also capable of change and continual
adaptation to new situations. Policy makers fascinated by moral absolutes, like
many of those who insist on explicitly prohibiting political assassination,
ultimately deprive U.S. foreign policy of its ability to respond to fluctuating
environmental challenges. Those indoctrinated in the notion of a value-free social
science, like many proponents of assassination, ultimately deprive America of its
character. U.S. foreign policy must straddle the gulf between realism and
idealism; for between these two points of influence moves our world. The
dissonance between interests and values, while being neither a blessing nor an
affliction, is among America's defining characteristics. The role of foreign policy,
therefore, must be to manage this contradiction, not to deny it.
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